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was held regarding the above-stated matter on July 6, 1987, and 
the defendant's motion for dismissal after the appellant had 
completed its case, was granted by the Court. The defendant 
tried for being in physical control of a motor vehicle in 
violation of Section 41-6-44(1) Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended. On the 6th day of July, 1987, the above case was 
presented to the judge without a jury. Appellant seeks reversal 
of the Circuit Court's decision. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
THAT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTED TO SUSTAIN A 
CONVICTION OF THE RESPONDENT INDEPENDENT OF THE 
INTOXILYZER RESULTS, AND BY DISMISSING THE STATE'S CASE 
ON THE BASIS OF INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND/OR REQUIRING 
THE OFFICER TO STATE SPECIFICALLY THE ULTIMATE FACTS, 
WAS ABUSE OF COURT DISCRETION, MAKING THE DECISION 
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND ORDINANCES 
A. Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-44(1), 1953, as 
amended. 
B. State v. Petree, 659 P. 2d 443, 444-45 (Utah 1983). 
C. In the Interest of I. , R. L. , 61 U. A. R 48 (Utah 1987). 
D. State v. Chambers, 533 P. 2d 876, 879 (Utah 1979). 
£. Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P. 2d 778 (Utah 1986). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE) 
In the early morning hours of June 5, 198 7, Officer Joe Yonk 
and Officer Spence Anderson were on routinq patrol in the Hyrum, 
Utahf area. The officers were traveling westbound on the west 
side of the Hyrum Dam when they observed a\ yellow Ford Maverick 
parked off the shoulder of the road approximately two to three 
feet (TR p. 5). The officers observed an individual behind the 
wheel with his head leaning toward the window (TR p. 36). 
The officers pulled behind and toi the side of the Ford 
Maverick and Officer Anderson, who was a paissenger in the patrol 
vehicle, went to the Ford Maverick to cheick on the condition of 
the driver (TR pp. 5, 37). The driver was awake and behind the 
wheel, the keys were in the ignition oif the vehicle, and the 
officer noticed signs of impairment asi he talked to the 
Respondent, Michael Chugg, and could smell and odor of alcohol 
coming from his breath (TR pp. 5, 6, 12, 212, 23, 40, 44). The 
officers also noticed that the speech of t|he Respondent was slow 
and not normal (TR p. 40). Officer Anderson had the suspect exit 
the vehicle noticing that the Respondeat appeared to be very 
unstable (TR p. 40). The suspect moved to the front of the 
patrol car where the officer proceeded to administer several 
field sobriety tests (TR p. 6). 
While the officer was administering the field sobriety 
tests, Officer Yonk exited the vehicle^ walked over to the 
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suspect's vehicle, and observed the keys in the ignition (TR p. 
44). At this time Officer Anderson requested the Respondent 
perform three field sobriety tests (TR p. 6). The first test 
performed was that of that horizontal gaze nystagmus (TR p. 7). 
The officer explained this test to the Respondent (TR p. 8). The 
officer then stated that the Respondent's eyes lacked that of 
smooth pursuit in both eyes and his eyes jerked at maximum 
deviation (TR p. 8). 
The next test requested to be performed by the Respondent 
was that of the walk and turn test (TR p. 9). The officer 
explained this test to the Respondent and asked him if he 
understood it (TR p. 10). He replied that he did (TR pp. 8, 10). 
The officer indicated that the Respondent was unable to place his 
right foot in front of his left foot and to perform the walk and 
turn test (TR pp. 9, 10). The officer also stated that the 
Respondent was very unstable on his feet and swayed back and 
forth as well as side to side (TR p. 10). 
The third field sobriety test the Respondent was requested 
to perform was that of the one leg stand and balance (TR p. 10). 
The officer demonstrated this test and asked the Respondent if he 
understood it and the Respondent responded that he did (TR p. 
11). The officer observed that the Respondent could not lift his 
foot off the ground for more than two seconds (TR p. 11). The 
Respondent tried to count, keeping his toes on the ground 
contrary to the instructions given by the officer (TR p. 11). 
After the field sobriety tests, officer Anderson placed the 
Respondent under arrest for being in physical control of a 
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vehicle while intoxicated pursuant to 
Section 41-6-44(1), (1953, as amended) (TRl 
defendant told the officers that he had been drinking on two 
Utah Code Annotated, 
pp. 12, 13, 14). The 
pondent stated that he 
f an alcoholic beverage 
occasions (TR pp. 16, 19, 20). The Res 
thought he was under the influence o 
according to the results of the intoxilyzer test results (TR p. 
20). 
Officer Joe Yonk observed two of the field sobriety tests 
that were being administered by Officer Anderson, the heel to toe 
and the balance test (TR pp. 37, 38 
testified that the Respondent was unable 
(TR p. 39). Also in Court both officers testified that the 
Respondent was obviously intoxicated and 
influence of an alcoholic beverage (TR p. 39) 
) . Officer Yonk also 
o perform either test 
definitely under the 
?he Respondent 
was transferred to the Cache County Jail I for the taking of a 
breath test (TR pp. 14, 39, 40). The breath test was taken; 
however, at the time of trial, the 4xPert witness on the 
intoxilyzer was unavailable (TR pp. 
intoxilyzer certificate for the period of 
of the breath sample from the Respondent had not yet been 
49-50). Also, the 
time after the taking 
prepared. The Court indicated, in its fi 
intoxilyzer samples had not been adnj 
indicating the blood alcohol, content that 
the Respondent was in physical control o^ 
the influence of alcohol (TR pp.58, 59, 61) 
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indings, that because 
itted into evidence, 
it could not find that 
a vehicle while under 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower Court abused its discretion in its interpretation 
of the facts pertaining to intoxication of the Respondent. The 
lower Court held that because the Appellant was unable to present 
the intoxilyzer test record results there was not sufficient 
evidence independent of the same to render a decision beyond a 
reasonable doubt as to the intoxication of the Respondent. 
It is the contention of the Appellant that the Court abused 
its discretion in requiring the Appellant witness to testify that 
the Respondent was "incapable of safely operating the vehicle" 
when both officers testified he was under the influence of 
alcohol in their professional opinion and when such a result can 
be drawn from the evidence presented to the Court. That the 
Court has abused its discretion in its interpretation of the case 
law, code sections, and facts regarding the impaired driver when 
sufficient evidence existed to find the Respondent guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
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ARGUMENT 
THAT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTED! TO SUSTAIN A 
CONVICTION OF THE RESPONDENT INDEPENDENT OF THE 
INTOXILYZER RESULTS, AND BY DISMISSING THE STATE'S CASE 
ON THE BASIS OF INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND/OR REQUIRING 
THE OFFICER TO STATE SPECIFICALLY THE ULTIMATE FACTS, 
WAS ABUSE OF COURT DISCRETION, MAKING THE DECISION 
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
In the case of State vs. Chambers, $33 P2 876, 879 (Utah 
1975), the Supreme Court held that "if discretion is reasonably 
used, and is not shown to have been abused, arbitrary, or 
capricious, the judgment of the trial court should not be 
disturbed." The facts indicate without any evidence to rebut the 
same that in the opinion of two offiders, with the combined 
experience of over twelve years, the Respondent, who was the 
operator of the vehicle and in physical cointrol of the same, was 
intoxicated and according to the more experienced officer was 
"obviously" intoxicated at the time of the ptop. 
The testimony before the Court indicated an obvious odor of 
alcohol coming from the person of the Respondent, that the 
officers noticed that his demeanor and physical characteristics 
showed signs of intoxication. As a result of receiving these 
signs, Officer Anderson requested the Respondent to take three 
field sobriety tests: 
(1) Gaze Nystagmus 
(2) Heel to Toe 
(3) Stand and Balance 
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After the Respondent attempted to perform the above three tests, 
it was the opinion of the Officer that he was unable to perform 
the tests in a satisfactory manner. As a direct result, Officer 
Anderson placed the Respondent under arrest. 
After the Officer placed the Respondent under arrest and 
transported him to the Cache County Jail and asked him if he 
would take an intoxilyzer test which he did. Officer Anderson 
gave Respondent his constitutional rights. According to the DUI 
report form, he asked him a series of questions. One question 
included whether or not Respondent thought he was "under the 
influence of an alcoholic beverage or drugs now." The Respondent 
stated, "I guess so according to the tests." 
In the Court findings on Page 59, of the transcript it 
stated: 
"Now, we have Officer Anderson, who testified that 
he felt that he was under the influence of alcohol, 
and Deputy Yonk, a veteran of many years on the 
force, saying that he felt that he was under the 
influence of alcohol; in fact, I believe he used 
little stronger words than that, that he was 
definitely under the influence of alcohol. And 
that presents the dilemma to the Court, quite 
frankly. 
I suppose if we look at Mr. Judd's argument in 
this particular case, that was he under the 
influence of alcohol at the time he left Ogden 
and he's now coming down, or did he have such 
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a stiff drink that when he was sitting there, 
he was coming up? We don't have any 
one way or another as to that, at legist at this 
point in time. The motion is simply lone to 
dismiss on the basis that the State has failed 
to meet its burden of proof and especially as 
cited under the Bugger case." 
testimony 
It is the position of the Appellant 
that the Court has abused its discretion irj 
of counsel which is not evidence before 
relying upon the evidence pertaining to intoxication at the time 
appears to the State 
relying upon argument 
the Court rather than 
the officers were at the scene of 
administering the field sobriety tests, 
upon the argument of counsel rather thanl 
which have been presented with the witnesl 
the crime and were 
For the Court to rely 
the evidence or facts 
ses being subject to 
cross examination is clearly abuse of discretion. 
The Court went on to state on Page 60 
"But in this case, I just have a naggi 
, there's n 
pf the transcript: 
ng—I have a 
nagging feeling on the one hand o doubt 
about the question the defendant was there, and he 
had—he was an impaired driver in a sense; and on 
the other hand, I have a nagging question is that 
nobody's told me that he was incapable of safely 
operating the vehicle. Now, I've gone through the 
test, looked at the test, the only test offered by 
the officers, which is designed, by its very creation, 
is to give a percentage of blood alcohol is 
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the gaze Nystagmus. That's the only one that I 
know of, all the rest of them are subjective. 
I'm not convinced that the balance test is a valid 
test for anybody. I find it, and I observed this 
myself among many judges that are sober as a judge, 
in a judicial conference, that had extreme difficulty 
using the balance test, holding one foot up and 
trying to count, it's very hard, especially at night. 
The other test was the heel-toe or walk-turn and 
obviously, the defendant did poorly on that one. 
Does that rise to the level that this person was— 
that would render this person incapable of safely 
operating the vehicle? I don't know, and when I'm 
not sure, I am not convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt. And if that's the level of proof at this 
point in time, at least at the end of the State's 
case, I think that the motion is well taken, and 
therefore, grant the same." 
It is clear from the facts that sufficient evidence existed 
for the Court to find the Defendant under the influence of 
alcohol at the time he was in physical control of the vehicle. 
The fact that the officers did not testify to the ultimate fact 
as stated by the Court above that is "nobody's told me that he 
was incapable of safely operating the vehicle." The Appellant or 
its witnesses are not required to testify to all of the ultimate 
facts when there is a sufficient quantum of evidence to indicate 
that the operator of the vehicle was impaired and under the 
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not specifically told 
influence of alcohol at the time, feoth officers clearly 
testified that this was the case. For tne Court to come to the 
conclusion that because the officers had 
the Court that he is incapable of safely operating the vehicle 
the Court has abuse of discretion to deny or disregard all of the 
other evidence and refuse to make this conclusion on its own. 
Even the statement of the Defendant, himself, to the officers 
that he was under the influence of alcohol coupled with 
the two officers who were at the scene should have been 
sufficient to indicate the intoxication of 
capability to operate a vehicle safely. 
According to Section 41-6-44(1)(a)4 
(1953 as amended) the statute in which the 
the Respondent and his 
Utah Code Annotated 
Respondent was charged 
was pled in the alternative, .08 and/or operating while under the 
influence of alcohol. Utah Code Annotated, Section 
41-6-44(1)(a): 
"It is unlawful and punishable as prov| 
Section for any person to operate or 
physical control of a vehicle within 
the person has a breath alcohol conte| 
greater by weight as shown by a chemi 
ided in this 
be in actual 
this state if 
nt of .08% or 
cal test given 
within two hours after the alleged operation or 
physical control, or if the person is 
influence of alcohol and any drug or 
influence of alcohol in any drug to a 
render the person incapable of safely 
vehicle." 
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under the 
the combined 
degree which 
operating a 
The evidence presented to the Courtf all went directly to 
the issues of whether or not the Respondent was under the 
influence of alcohol and incapable of safely operating the 
vehicle* For the Court to dismiss the Appellant's action because 
the officers did not specifically state or use the language 
pertained in the code section of incapable of safely operating a 
vehicle is abuse of discretion in the Court's interpretation of 
the facts which it has been presented with. 
The Utah Court of Appeals In the Interest Of: I.
 y R. L., a 
Person under Eighteen Years, 61 Utah Advance Reports 48f (Utah 
July 15, 1987) held that an individual may be found guilty of 
Section 41-6-44 Utah Annotated 1953 aside from the blood test 
when there is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. The 
Court of Appeals held that, "It is well settled that the 
reviewing Court has the power to review a case on the sufficiency 
of evidence." Within the body of In The Interest of: I., R. L., 
supra, the Court cited State vs. Petree, 659 Pacific 2d 443, 444-
45 (Utah 1983) where the Utah Supreme Court indicated that when 
the fabric of evidence against the Defendant covers the gap 
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt that 
the reviewing Court may find a sufficient amount of evidence for 
a conviction. However, the Court did state, "that this does mean 
that the Court can take a speculative leap across a remaining gap 
in order to sustain a verdict. The evidence stretched to its 
utmost limits, must be sufficient to prove the Defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt." The Appellant readily accepts this 
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burden and suggests that there is sufficient evidence to show 
that the Court abused its discretion in granting the Respondent's 
Motion to Dismiss. 
In State vs. Petree, supra, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
in "reviewing the evidence and all inferences which may be 
reasonably drawn that if reasonable minds could not entertain 
reasonable doubt that the Appellant committed the crime for which 
he was convicted and that the evidentiary fabric need not even be 
stretched to come to this conclusion". 
The Court found in In the Interest of; I, R. L., supra, that 
there was sufficient evidence and that the Iblood test would only 
be cumulative. It is the position of the Appellant, based on the 
evidence in this case, that the blood testsi would be no more than 
cumulative evidence to indicate that the Respondent was impaired 
and unable to safely operate a motor vehicle. 
In the Court's final analysis and findings, it indicated 
that a Gaze Nystagmus field test is a valid test but yet it 
appears refused to give any weight to the s£me. 
The balance test was basically thrown out by the Judge and 
not given any weight based upon the fact that the Judge at a 
judicial conference had extreme difficulty In performing the test 
when he was not intoxicated. The Appellant is not contending 
that maybe the Judge is, along with other people, unable to 
perform this test completely in a sober condition. However, when 
looking at the totality of the evidence and the other two tests 
that were given as part of the field sojpriety test, it is the 
ability of the individual to follow the instructions and attempt 
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to perform the test as closely as possible as the officer has 
explained that indicates whether rhe Respondent is impaired or 
not and thus could safety operate a vehicle. The facts 
presently before the Court indicate that the Respondent was 
unable to do so and for the Court to unilaterally throw the test 
out because of the Court's inability to perform the test at a 
judicial conference ignores the facts which have been presented 
before it and make such an arbitrary and capricious decision. 
The Court's findings indicate in regards to the heel to toe 
or the walk and turn test the Defendant obviously did poorly on 
the same. However, when the Court isolated this test as the only 
test there was a valid test, it was not convinced that it should 
dismiss the Defendant's motion because of one test given by the 
officers that in the Court's opinion was valid. 
It is the position of the Appellant that based upon the 
Court's reasoning, and the facts in this matter, that the Court 
made an arbitrary and capricious decision and did so as a result 
of abuse of its judicial discretion. 
In light of the above reasoning, Appellant respectfully 
submits that the lower Court abused its discretion and its 
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interpretations of the facts and how the facts should be applied 
to Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44(1)(^) (1953 as amended). 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant respectfully submits th^t the decision made by 
the Circuit Court Judge is arbitrary and capricious and that it 
abused its discretion in granting the Respondent's Motion to 
Dismiss after the Appellant had rested. For the Court to grant 
the Respondent's Motion, it would have had to rely upon 
information or arguments of counsel who was not properly 
submitted as evidence to be given weight a|t this particular time 
of the trial stage. Appellant respectfully requests that the 
Utah Court of Appeals reverse the judgment lof the lower court and 
remand the matter for a new trial. 
Respectflully submitted, 
>R" BURBl^ NK 
:ache County Attorney 
fy for the State of Utah 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to C. DeMont Judd, Attorney for 
Defendant, at 2650 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah 84401. 
DATED this 22c/ day of September, 198 7. 
B URBAN K 
che County Attorney 
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ADDENDUM 
- 1 7 -
41-6-43.10. Motor Vehicles t^ TAHCODE 19I7-I98I 
Ml 
IMS 
penalties, or that governs any combination of those 
matters, shall be consistent with the provisions in 
this code which govern those matters. 
(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority 
that governs reckless driving, or operating a vehicle 
in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of 
persons or property shall be consistent with the 
provisions of this code which govern those matters, 
41-6-43.10. Repealed. 
41-6-44. Driving under the Influence of alcohol 
or drug or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol 
content • Measurement of blood or breath 
alcohol - Criminal punishment • Arrest without 
warrant • Penalties • Suspension or revocation 
of license. 
OXs) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in 
this section for any person to operate or be in actual 
physical control of a vehicle within this state if the 
person has a blood or breath alcohol content of 
,08^b or greater by weight as shown by a chemical 
test given within two hours after the alleged opera-
tion or physical control, or if the person is under 
the influence of alcohol or any drug or the comb-
ined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree 
which renders the person incapable of safely oper-
ating a vehicle. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with viola-
ting this section is or has been legally entitled to use 
alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any charge 
of violating this section. 
(2) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall 
be based upon grams of alcohol per 100 cubic cen-
timeters of blood, and the percent by weight of 
alcohol in the breath shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3)(a) Every person who is convicted the first time 
of a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. But if the person has inflicted a 
bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of 
having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner, 
he is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is 
that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that 
degree of care which an ordinarily reasonable and 
prudent person exercises under like or similar circ-
umstances. 
(4) In addition to any penalties imposed under 
Subsection (3), the court shall, upon a first convic-
tion, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less 
than 48 consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours, 
with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the 
jail, or require the person to work in a community-
service work program for not less than 24 hours nor 
more than 50 hours and, in addition to the jail 
sentence or the work in the community-service 
work program, order the person to participate in an 
assessment and educational series at a licensed 
alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(5Xa) Upon a second conviction within five years 
after a first conviction under this section or under a 
local ordinance similar to this section adopted in 
compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court 
shall, in addition to any penalties imposed under 
Subsection (3), impose a mandatory jail sentence of 
not less than 240 consecutive hours nor more than 
720 hours, with emphasis on serving in the drunk 
tank of the jail, or require the person to work in a 
community-service work program for not less than 
80 hours nor more than 240 hours and, in addition 
to the jail sentence or the work in the community-
service work program, order the person to partici-
pate in an assessment and educational series at a 
licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility. The court 
may, in its discretion, order the person to obtain 
treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility 
(b) Upon a subsequent conviction within five 
years after a second conviction under this section or 
under a local ordinance similar to this section 
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-
43(1), the court shall, in addition to any penalties 
imposed under Subsection (3), impose a mandatory 
jail sentence of not less than 720 nor more than 
2,160 hours with emphasis on serving in the drunk 
tank of the jail, or require the person to work in a 
community-service work project for not less than 
240 nor more than 720 hours and, in addition to the 
jail sentence or work in the community-service 
work program, order the person to obtain treatment 
at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(c) No portion of any sentence imposed under 
Subsection (3) may be suspended and the convicted \ 
person is not eligible for parole or probation until J 
any sentence imposed under this section has been 
served. Probation or parole resulting from a convi-« 
ction for a violation of this section or a local ordi-| 
nance similar to this section adopted in compliance i 
with Subsection 41-6-43(1) may not be terminated 5 
and the department may not reinstate any license*: 
suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction, ;5 
if it is a second or subsequent conviction within fivel 
years, until the convicted person has funiished evi-| 
dence satisfactory to the department that all fines; 
and fees, including fees for restitution arid rehabil-j 
itation costs, assessed against the person, have beeni 
paid.
 :f 
(6Xa) The provisions in Subsections (4) and (5)1 
that require a sentencing court to order a convictedi 
person to: participate in an assessment and educat-* 
tonal series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation faci4 
iity; obtain, in the discretion of the court, treatment^ 
at an alcohol rehabilitation facility; or obtain, | 
mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation;; 
facility, or do any combination of those things*? 
apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 4U\ 
6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under Sub*| 
ection (7). The court is required to render the same! 
order regarding education or treatment at an alcohol^ 
rehabilitation facility, or both, in connection with aj 
first, second, or subsequent conviction under^ 
Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense'! 
under Subsection (7), as the court would render in* 
connection with applying respectively, the first, j 
second, or subsequent conviction requirements o £ 
Subsections 41-6-44(4) and (5). 
(b) For purposes of determining 
conviction under Section 41-6-45 which 
as a prior conviction under Subsection (7), 
second, or subsequent conviction under this subset 
ction, a previous conviction under either this section5: 
or Section 41-6-45 is considered a prior con vie--
tion. 
(c) Any alcohol rehabilitation program and any, 
community-based or other education program 
provided for in this section shall be approved by the] 
Department of Social Services. 
(7)(a) When the prosecution agrees to la plea 
guilty or no contest to a charge of a violation o f 
Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted under 
Subsection 41-6-43(1) in satisfaction of, or as a* 
substitute for, an original charge of a violation of 
Whether atf 
qualified! 
is a firsCj 
this section, the prosecution shall state; 
record a factual basis for the plea 
whether or not there had been consumption of* 
4 
for the; 
including'. 
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alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the 
defendant in connection with the offense. The stat-
ement is an offer of proof of the facts which shows 
whether there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, 
or a combination of both, by the defendant, in 
connection with the offense. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before 
accepting the plea offered under this subsection o f 
i he consequences of a violation of Section 41-6-
45 as follows: If the court accepts the defendant's 
plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of violating 
Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor states for the 
record that there was consumption of alcohol or 
drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant 
in connection with the offense, the resulting convi-
ction is a prior offense for the purposes o f Subsec-
tion (5). 
(c) The court shall notify the department o f 
each conviction of Section 41-6-45 which is a 
prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5). 
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest 
a person for a violation of this section when the 
officer has probable cause to believe the violation 
has occurred, although not in his presence, and if 
the officer has probable cause to believe that the 
violation was committed by the person. 
(9) The department of Public Safety shall suspend 
for 90 days the operator's license of any person 
convicted for the first time under Subsection (1), 
and shall revoke for one year the license o f any 
person otherwise convicted under this section, except 
that the department may subtract from any suspe-
nsion period the number of days for which a license 
was previously suspended under Section 41-2-130 
if the previous suspension was based on the same 
occurrence upon which the record of conviction is 
based. Ml 
41-6-44.1. (Effective January 1, 19*8). 
Procedures - Adjudicative proceedings. 
The Department of Public Safety shall comply 
with the procedures and requirements of Chapter 
46b, Title 63, in its adjudicative proceedings. \m 
41-6-44.2. Repealed. lfts 
41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis 
• Evidence. 
(1) The commissioner of the Department of 
Public Safety shall establish standards for the 
administration and interpretation of chemical anal-
ysis of a person's breath, including standards of 
training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is 
material to prove that a person was operating or in 
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a 
blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohib-
ited, documents offered as memoranda or records of 
acts, conditions, or events to prove that the analysis 
was made and the instrument used was accurate, 
according to standards established in Subsection (1), 
are admissible if: 
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the 
regular course of the investigation at or about the 
time of the act, condition, or event; and 
(b) the source of information from which made 
and the method and circumstances of their prepar-
ation indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards establi-
shed under Subsection (1) and the conditions of 
Subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption 
that the test results are valid and further foundation 
for introduction of the evidence is unnecessary. im 
41-6-44.5. Admissibility of chemical test results in 
actions for driving under the influence - Weight 
of evidence. 
(1) In any action or proceeding in which it is 
material to prove that a person was operating or in 
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs or with a blood or 
breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, the 
results of a chemical test or tests as authorized in 
Section 41-6-44.10 are admissible as evidence. 
(2) If the chemical test was taken more than two 
hours after the alleged driving or actual physical 
control, the test result is admissible as evidence of 
the person's blood or breath alcohol level at the 
time of the alleged operating or actual physical 
control, but the trier of fact shall determine what 
weight is given to the result of the test. 
(3) This section does not prevent a court from 
receiving otherwise admissible evidence as to a def-
endant's blood or breath alcohol level or drug level 
at the time of the alleged operating or actual phys-
ical control. 19S7 
41-6-44.8. Municipal attorneys for specified 
offenses may prosecute for driving while license 
suspended or revoked. 
Alleged violations of Section 41-2-136, which 
consist of the person operating a vehicle while his 
operator's license is suspended or revoked for a 
violation of Section 41-6-44, a local ordinance 
which complies with the requirements of Section 41-
6-43. Section 41-6-44.10, Section 76-5-207, 
or a criminal prohibition that the person was 
charged with violating as a result of a plea bargain 
after having been originally charged with violating 
one or more of those sections or ordinances, may be 
prosecuted by attorneys of cities and towns as well 
as by prosecutors who are empowered elsewhere in 
this code to prosecute those alleged violations. im 
41-6-44.10. (Effective through December 31, 
i 1987). -Implied consent to chemical tests for 
alcohol or drug - Number of tests • Refusal • 
Warning, report - Hearing, revocation of license 
• Appeal • Person incapable of refusal -
Results of test available - Who may give test -
Evidence. 
,(l)(a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this 
state is considered to have given his consent to a 
chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine 
for the purpose of determining whether he was 
operating or in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol 
content statutorily prohibited, or while under the 
influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of 
alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, if 
the test is or tests are administered at the direction 
of a peace officer having grounds to believe that 
person to have been operating or in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or 
breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or 
while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 
41-6-44. 
(b) The peace officer determines which of the 
tests are administered and how many of them, shall 
be administered. If an officer requests more than 
one test, refusal by a person to take one or more 
requested tests, even though he does submit to any 
other requested test or tests, is a refusal under this 
section. 
(c) A person who has been requested under this 
section to submit to a chemical test or tests of his 
foot* Co 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
In the interest of I., R.L. 
A Person under Eighteen Years 
Before Judges Garf f, Greenwood and Bench. 
No. 860184-CA 
FILED: July 15,19S7 
THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE 
Hon. Leslie D. Brown 
ATTORNEYS: 
John L. Chidester for Appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, Bruce M. Hale, Joseph 
E. Tesch for Respondent. 
OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
RLI appeals from a juvenile court finding 
chat he violated Utah Code Ann. 941 
(1977) by driving while intoxicated. The cot 
.fined him $150.00, ordered him to pay S100.< 
into the Victim's Restitution Fund, ant 
revoked his driving privileges for ninety days. 
On May 12, 1985, appellant RLI was invo-
lved in a head-on collision which injured th< 
driver of the other vehicle. Two investigating! 
peace officers concluded that because he was 
alone in the vehicle he was the driver, and that 
he was under the influence of alcohol because! 
of his speech, behavior, and alcoholic odor. 
The investigating officers sent him to the I 
Wasatch County Hospital in an ambulance, 
but did not place him under arrest. At the 
hospital, a third officer also failed to place 
him under arrest. A medical technician assi-
sted this third officer by taking a blood 
sample from appellant. The officer, however, 
did noc inform appellant that the purpose of 
the blood test was to determine his blood 
alcohol content. 
At trial, appellant's counsel moved to sup-
press the blood test results. The court denied 
the motion to suppress and found that on May 
12, 1985, the juvenile operated a motor vehicle 
under the influence of an intoxicant. 
I 
The first issue in this case is whether the 
blood test result should have been excluded as 
the product of an unconstitutional search and 
seizure. The purpose of constitutional provis-
ions against unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures is to protect personal privacy and dignity 
against unwarranted intrusion by the state. 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646-53, 81 
S.Ct. 1684, 86-90, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). 
The fourth amendment of the U. S. Constit-
ution protects against unreasonable warrant-
less searches, searches that exceed the scope of 
a warrant, and personal searches prior to a 
legal arrest. Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43f* 
127 N.Y.S.2d 116,-124 (1954),. ~ •
 r-
The U. S. Supreme Court in Schmcrber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 
L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), found blood testing pro 
cedures to 'plainly constitute searches of 
persons' within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment, stating: 
Compulsory administration of a 
blood test ... plainly involves the 
broadly conceived reach of a search 
and seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment. . . . Such,testing proc-
edures plainly constitute searches of 
'persons' and depend antecedently 
upon seizures of 'persons', within 
the meaning of that Amendment .... 
(T]hc Fourth Amendment's proper 
function is to constrain, not against 
all intrusions as such, but against 
intrusions which are not justified in 
the circumstances, or which are 
made in an improper manner. In 
other words, the questions we must 
decide in this case are whether the 
police were justified in requiring 
petitioner to submit to the blood 
test, and whether the means and 
procedures employed in taking his 
blood respected relevant Fourth 
Amendment standards of reasona-
bleness. 
Id. at 767; 86 S.Ct. at 1834; 16 L.Ed.2d at 
914. 
In Schmcrber, the arresting officer was 
justified in requiring defendant's submission 
to the blood test.because he "plainly (had] 
probable cause" to arrest him and charge him 
with driving under the influence of alcohol. In 
determining whether the means and procedures 
the officer employed in taking his blood res-
pected relevant fourth amendment standards, 
the Supreme Court considered whether the 
arresting officer was required to obtain a 
search warrant because "search warrants are 
ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, 
and absent an emergency, no less could be 
required where intrusions into the human body 
are concerned." id. at 770. The Court concl-
uded that "the attempt to secure evidence of 
blood-alcohol content in this case was an 
appropriate incident to the petitioner's arrest" 
because the arresting officer could reasonably 
believe that he was confronted with an emer-
gency in which the delay necessary to obtain a 
warrant could result in the destruction of the 
evidence because of natural dissipation of 
alcohol in a person's blood stream. Id. at 770-
71. Further, such a blood test was a reason-
able type of test because blood tests are com-
monplace, the quantity of blood extracted was 
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minimal, there was virtually no risk, trauma, 
or pain involved, and it was performed in a 
reasonable manner by a physician in a hospital 
environment. Therefore, requiring submission 
to a blood test following a lawful arrest is not 
a violation of the fourth and fourteenth 
amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. 
In the present case, we must, as in Schme-
rbcr, decide: (1) whether the police were just-
ified in requiring appellant to submit to the 
blood test, and (2) whether the means and 
procedures employed in taking his blood res-
pected relevant constitutional standards of 
reasonableness. 
Considering the second issue first, the 
means and procedures employed in taking 
appellant's blood were substantially similar to 
those employed in Schmcrbcr. The test invo-
lved the same degree of exigency as in Schm-
crbcr, was a routine taking of blood, and was 
performed by a medical technician in a hosp-
ital setting under accepted medical practices. 
Therefore, the means and procedures involved 
in taking the blood were constitutional. 
However, the major issue in the present case is 
whether the peace officers were justified in 
requiring appellant to give blood to be tested. 
There was clearly probable cause to place 
appellant under arrest for a violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §41-6-44(a) (1977),'because of 
the investigating officer's observations of 
appellant's slurred speech, erratic behavior, 
odor of alcohol, and because appellant was 
the only person in his vehicle. However, app-
ellant was not placed under arrest prior to the 
taking of the blood sample. Furthermore, even 
though the officer stated that appellant was 
coherent enough to understand him at the time 
of taking the blood, he did not even advise 
appellant of his rights, inform him of the 
nature of the blood test,, nor warn him of the 
consequences of refusal to submit to the blood 
test. Obviously, no arrest occurred, and the 
taking of the blood sample was not justified as 
a search incident to arrest. After appellant was 
released from the hospital, he returned home 
and was served four days later with a 
summons and citation. 
An officer's demand that a non-arrested 
motorist submit to a chemical test may lead to 
arbitrary and unreasonable action by police 
officers,2 and to a potentially unconstitutional 
search and seizure. However, the constituti-
onal right to be secure against unreasonable 
searches and seizures may be waived if the 
defendant gives actual consent to the search in 
question. i 
The next inquiry is whether appellant, in 
fact, consented to the blood test, either 
through statutorily implied consent or actual 
consent. The relevant portions of Utah's 
implied consent law states: 
(a) Any person operating a motor 
vehicle in this state shall be deemed 
to have given his consent to a che-
mical test or tests of his breath, 
blood or urine for the purpose of 
determining whether he was driving 
or in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle while under the infl-
uence of alcohol, any drug, or 
combination of alcohol and any 
drug, provided that such test is or 
tests are administered at the direc-
tion of a peace officer having 
grounds to believe such person to 
have been driving o^. in actual 
physical control of a n&tor vehicle 
while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or combination 
of alcohol and any drug .... 
(b) If such person has been 
placed under arrest and has there-
after been requested by a peace 
officer to submit to any one or 
more of the chemical tests provided 
for in subsection (a) of this section 
and refuses to submit to such che-
mical test or tests* such person shall 
be warned by a peace officer requ-
esting the test or tests that a refusal 
to submit to the test or tests can 
result in revocation of his license to 
operate a motor vehicle 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.10(a) and (b) 
(1981). 
Although this statute appears to legislatively 
create actual consent to a chemical test on 
behalf of any person operating a motor 
vehicle, it does not. It seems enigmatic to 
interpret the statute to mean that if a driver 
has impliedly consented to a blood test under 
subsection (a), he may nevertheless refuse 
under subsection (b) and withdraw his supp-
osed consent. In fact, 'consent* describes a 
legal act, and 'refusal* a physical reality. By 
implying consent, the statute removes the right 
of a driver to lawfully refuse, but cannot 
remove his physical power to refuse. The 
Oregon Supreme Court, concerning drivers 
arrested for driving under the influence, has 
observed: 
[Rjefusal as contemplated by the 
statute is something other than 
withholding of consent because 
consent is legally implied. It is a 
refusal to comply with the consent 
which has already been given as a 
condition of a license to drive. The 
purpose of a warning of license 
suspension following a refusal is to 
overcome an unsanctioned refusal 
by threat instead of force. It is not 
to reinstate a right to choice, let 
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alone a voluntary and informed 
choice, but rather to non-forcibly 
enforce, the driver's previous 
implied consent. 
State v. Newton, 291 Or. 788, 636 P.2d 393J 
398(1981). 
Thus, the purpose of such a law is to avoidl 
the violence which often attends attempts to 
forcibly test recalcitrant drivers.4Through the 
threat of potential license suspension and the 
spectre of use of a refusal to submit to a| 
blood test as evidence in any civil or criminal 
action, police may persuade otherwise unwil-
ling drivers to submit to the test. Nothing 
suggests a legit'ative intent to create a consent 
search, but only to create a means of non-
physical persuasion. 
Furthermore, implied consent by statute 
cannot supersede an otherwise constitutionally 
protected right. For this reason, the Utah 
Supreme Court in State v. Cruz, 21 Utah 2d 
406, 446 P.2d 307 (1968), required actual 
consent to a blood alcohol test when the driver 
was not under arrest. Cruz stated that implied 
consent is valid only in arrest situations, and 
only after an opportunity is given to refuse to 
comply with the implied consent law. 
In February, 1977, the version of Utah 
Code Ann. §41-6-44.10 (1975) which was 
interpreted in Cruz, was amended by changing 
the words "arresting officer" to "peace 
officer'.mie State argues that this change 
altered the results of Cruz to such an extent 
that implied consent is now permissible in a 
non-arrest situation, and, therefore, a 
warrant is not necessary to draw blood for 
testing. We are not persuaded by this argu-
ment. We conclude that the changes in the 
statute do not alter the basic constitutional 
protection of requiring a warrant for search 
and seizure prior to an arrest, and construe 
the statute to require this procedure. 
In summary, implied consent justifies war-
rantless searches under the following circum-
stances: 
(1) There is probable cause to 
believe the suspect was driving or in 
control of a motor vehicle while 
having a statutorily prohibited 
blood alcohol content, 
(2) The suspect was arrested; and 
(3) The method of extraction of 
blood was reasonable. 
The rationale behind permitting such a search 
is that the blood alcohol evidence dissipates 
over time, creating an exigent circumstance 
which justifies a warrantless search. Because 
appellant was not arrested, a warrantless 
search was not justified and he did not come 
under the implied consent statute. Therefore, 
to sustain his conviction, pursuant to Cruz, 
there must be a finding of actual consent. Cruz, 
446 P.2d at 309. 
The evidence indicates that appellant did not 
give actual consent to the blood test. There 
was nothing in his demeanor or behavior 
indicating actual consent. Qn the contrary, he 
apparently offered some resistance to the 
taking of blood. Further, no one informed 
him that blood was being taken for purposes 
of determining blood alcohol content. If the 
officer had assumed appellant was under 
arrest, he should have requested that he 
submit to a blood test and have given him the 
opportunity to comply or refuse. If appellant 
had refused, the officer would then have been 
obligated to explain the consequences of 
refusal, which he did not do. Also, under the 
circumstances, reasonable minds could conc-
lude that blood was being withdrawn for 
medical rather than law-enforcement purp-
oses. 
Because actual consent cannot be inferred 
from the statute and appellant did not actually 
consent to the procedure, the taking of the 
blood sample did not come within the consent 
exception to reasonable search and seizure 
requirements. Therefore, we conclude that the 
police failed to follow proper procedures and 
were not justified in requiring appellant to 
submit to the blood test. Consequently, the 
blood test evidence must be excluded as the 
product of an unconstitutional search and 
seizure. 
The purpose of the implied consent law is to 
achieve the legitimate legislative purpose of 
curtailing the terrible carnage on the highways 
through quick removal from the highway of 
those drivers who are a menace to themselves 
and to others because they operate a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol 
and/or drugs. This purpose can be realized 
without compromising fundamental constitu-
tional rights. Present procedures, if followed, 
are consistent with this concept. 
U 
'The second issue is whether there was suff-* 
ideat^evkicocev^thout -^ test, to 
sustain appellant's conviction. 
The trial judge, the trier of fact in the 
instant case, was discussing the blood test 
issue with counsel during trial, focusing on the 
test's significance and admissibility. In this 
context, he made the following gratuitous 
comment: "I think without the blood test you 
lhave some problems. I think without the 
blood there is at least some reasonable doubt 
.* Because he was not evaluating all the 
dence previously presented and because 
uch a finding was not made in his ultimate 
indings of fact, this comment, at this point in 
he proceedings, does not rise to the level of a 
inding of fact, and we will disregard it..Thus;; 
dsitte'!t^!Mtoif%He^er"or not threviaencer 
Its rwarsuffic*' -
to sustain appellant's conviction: 
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. 
'atson, 684 P.2d 39. 41 (Utah 1984), stated 
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that "(ijt is well settled that a reviewing court 
has the power to review a case on the suffici-
ency of the evidence.4" The Court defined the 
standard of review in criminal cases in State v. 
Petrec, 659 P.2d 443, 444-45 (Utah 1983): 
(W]e review the evidence and all 
inferences which may be reasonably 
drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury. 
We reverse a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improb-
able (hat reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted ... 
(citations omitted). This Court still 
has the right to review the suffici-
ency of the evidence to support the 
verdict. The fabric of evidence 
against the defendant must cover 
the gap between the presumption of 
innocence and the proof of guilt. In 
fulfillment of its duty to review the 
evidence and all inferences which 
may reasonably be drawn from it in 
the light most favorable to the 
verdict, the reviewing court will 
stretch the evidentiary fabric as far 
as it will go. But this does not mean 
that the court can take a speculative* 
leap across a remaining gap m order _ 
to sustain a verdict* The evidence,* 
stretched to its utmost limits, must" 
be sufficient to prove the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Pursuant to this standard, we review the 
sufficiency of the evidence from the record. In 
this case, the record shows the following facts: 
Appellant was involved in a serious head-on 
collision. He had been driving erratically in 
the wrong lane of traffic on a blind curve. The 
other driver stated that she saw only one 
person in appellant's truck just prior to the 
collision, and appellant was the only person 
found in the truck. Though upset, the appel-
lant was not seriously injured and repeatedly 
made unsolicited, voluntary statements while 
not in custody, such as, "I am drunk. I am 
juilty. They should take me out and shoot 
me.* At times he talked incoherently in a 
rambling manner, and "screamed and holl-
ered/ There was a strong alcoholic odor both 
it the scene of the accident and later at the 
hospital. Because no alcohol containers were 
found in the truck, the odor was coming from 
pie*; appellant's person. In the non-custodial 
Hfuation at the hospital, when his step-father 
liked him whether he had taken drugs, he 
lUted, 'No, just whiskey.* The highway pat-
rolman who testified and was at the hospital, 
Was an eighteen year veteran, had investigated 
hundreds of drunk driving episodes, and had 
concluded the appellant was under the influ-
ence of intoxicants. 
The defense presented no evidence. 
We find from reviewing the evidence that 
reasonable minds,could not. entertain a reas-
onable doubt that the appellant committed the 
crime Tor which he was convicted and that the 
evidentiary fabric need.not even be stretched 
to come to this conclusion. We therefore find, 
even excluding the blood test, that there is 
sufficient evidence to sustain appellant's 
conviction in the juvenile court and that the 
blood test evidence was only cumulative. 
Appellant's conviction is affirmed. 
R. W. Garff, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
1. The statute, in relevant part, states: "(i)t is unla-
wful and punishable as provided in subsection (d) of 
this section for any person who is under the influ-
ence of alcohol, or who is under the influence of 
any drug or combined influence of alcohol or any 
drug to a degree which renders the person incapable 
of safely driving a vehicle, to drive or be in actual 
physical control of any vehicle within this state....' 
2. The New York Court stated, in construing a 
similar statute, that "(ujnder the statute as written, 
any 'police officer,* whether he be a state trooper, 
city patrolman, deputy sheriff or town constable, 
may approach a motor vehicle operator, and clai-
ming to have reasonable grounds to suspect him of 
then operating a vehicle in an intoxicated condition, 
demand that he give blood for a chemical test or 
that he submit to one of the other chemical tests 
provided for by the statute. This may, in fact, be 
done upon the street without the making of an 
arrest and without the presence of witnesses. In fact, 
the officer may say to a motorist, 'Pull over to the 
curb. It looks to me as if you are drunk. I want you 
to come with me for the taking of a test of your 
blood.' If the driver refuses, or if the officer 
assumes a refusal on the driver's pan, his license 
may be revoked without a hearing upon a mere ex 
pane communication by the officer to the commis-
sioner.- Schutt v. MMcDuff. 205 Misc. 43, 127 
N.Y.S.2d 116.126(1954). 
3. 'Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, 
but should be shown by clear and convincing evid-
ence, and any consent must be voluntary and unc-
oerced, other physically or psychologically.- 68 
Am.Jur.2dSea/c/iesuidSeizures, §46(1973). 
4. in the instant case the peace officer testified that 
*[w)e tried to calm him down so he [the medical 
technician) could hold him [appellant 1 still enough 
to be able to draw the blood, and he drew the blood 
.... He (appellant) was shaking. Occasionally, he's 
[sic) twitch and squirm around, as though he were 
in shock or his eyes would sort of flutter as he laid 
back. He could hear us and he was aware of what 
was around him. but we just wanted to make sure 
that we could (get) him to hold still long enough to 
not - to not cause any injury as he drew the 
blood.* 
5. The statute was amended as follows: 
(a) Any person operating a motor 
vehicle in this state shall be deemed to 
have given his consent to a chemical test 
——..it rode«Co's Annotation Servkt 
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or tests of his breath, (ef | blood, or urine 
for the purpose of determining (the ale 
oh oik? concern of hw blood] whether he 
was driving or in actual physical control 
of a motor vehicle while under the infl-
uence of alcohol, any drug, or combin-
ation of alcohol and any drug, provided 
that such test is or tests are administered 
at the direction of a peace officer having 
[ reasonable) grounds to believe such 
person to have been driving (in on into 
wieated condition) or in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
combination of alcohol and any drug. 
P>e arresting] A peace officer shall det-
ermine (within fCQson] which of the afo-
resaid tests shall be administered. 
No person, who has been requested 
pursuant to this section to submit to a 
chemical test or tests of his breath, 
blood, or urine, shall have the right to 
select the test or tests to be administ-
ered. The failure or inability of a peace 
officer to arrange for any specific, test 
shall not be a defense to taking a test 
requested by a peace officer nor be a 
defense in any criminal, civil or admin* 
tstrativc proceeding resulting from a 
person's refusal to submit to the requ-
ested test or tests. 
((b) Any person operating a motor 
vehicle in this state shall be determined 
to have given his consent to a chemical 
test or tests of his Wood or urine for the 
purpose of determining whether he was 
driving or was in actual physical control 
of a motor vehicle while under the infl-
uence of any norcotte drug or other drug 
if arrested for any offense where, at the 
time of orresi, the arresting officer haj 
reasonable—grounds to believe such 
person to have been driving or in actual 
physical control of o motor vehicle while 
under the influence of o narcotic drug or 
other drug.] 
((e)| \b) If such person has been placed 
under arrest and has thereafter been 
requested by a peace officer to submit to 
a n v o n €
 Qf raorc of the chemical tests 
provided for in [subsections] subsection 
(a) ler-tb)] of this section and refuses to 
submit to such chemical test or tests, 
such person shall be warned by a peace 
officer requesting the test or tests that a 
refusal to submit to the test or tests can 
result in revocation of his license to 
operate a motor vehicle. Following this 
warning, unless such person immediately 
requests the chemical test or tests as 
offered by a peace officer be administ-
ered, (the) no test shall (not] be given and 
(the arresting] a peace officer shall (adv»e 
the person—of—his—nghts—under this 
*1 submit a sworn report that he 
had grounds to believe the arrested 
person had been driving or was in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol or any 
drug or combination of alcohol and any 
drug and that the person had refused to 
submit to a chemical test or tests as set 
forth in subsection (a) of this section. 
BENCH, Judge: (Concurring and Dissenting) 
I concur with the conclusion that the blood 
est was erroneously admitted into evidence 
ut I reserve judgment on the constitutional 
asis for the conclusion. 
The blood test would be admissible if app- r 
nsent is clearly absent. The narrow question 
fore us is whether the test was admissible 
nder Utah's implied consent statute. Utah 
(tode Ann. §41-6-44.10(1986). 
The arrest of a motorist is the triggering 
mechanism of our implied consent statute. State 
vl Cruz, 21 Utah 2d 406, 446 P.2d 307 
(1968). Other jurisdictions have also so ruled. 
See Lcrblance, Implied Consent To Intoxica-
tion Tests: A Flawed Concept, 53 St. John's 
L. Rev. 39. 42 n.9 (1978). The State contends 
the legislature attempted to delete the requir-
ement of arrest by changing "arresting officer* 
to 'peace officer.* Yet, the statute still cont-
emplates that motorists do not become subjea 
to the implied consent law until after a formal 
airest. Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.10(2) 
(1986) imposes sanctions where the motorist 
"has been placed under arrest and has there-
after been requested by a peace officer to 
submit to any one or more of the chemical 
teits provided . . . . 'The only exceptions to the 
arrest requirement-are where the motorist is 
, unconscious, or in any other condition, 
rendering^him incapable of refusing to submit 
to{ ariy^such chemical lest ..I0 Utah Code 
n. §41-6-44.10(3) (1986). 
t the time the test was administered in the 
instant case, appellant was neither under arrest 
nor in a condition rendering him incapable of 
refusing the test. The test was therefore erro-
neously admitted under the implied consent 
statute. Because the issue may be decided on 
grounds of statutory construction, discussion 
of constitutional considerations is inappropr-
iate^ State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982), 
ana cases cited therein. 
While I concur in the conclusion concerning 
the blood test, I believe the case should be 
remanded for a new trial. I therefore dissent 
from the result reached in the majority 
opinion. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44(1) (1986) 
provides for alternative means of proving a 
person guilty of driving while intoxicated. The 
prosecution may prove, by chemical test, the 
person had a blood-alcohol content of .08^ 
or greater. Alternatively, the prosecution may 
prove, by independent evidence, the person 
was under the influence of alcohol or any drug 
"to a degree which renders the person incap-
able of safely driving a vehicle." See Kehl v. 
Schiendiman, 735 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah App. 
1987). 
Vor complete Utiih Code Annotations, consult Code •Co ' i Annotation Service 
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As intimated by the majority, the trial judge 
in the instant case made no finding as to the 
sufficiency of independent evidence. At the 
conclusion of the State's case, appellant 
moved to suppress all evidence related to the 
blood test. The court took the matter under 
advisement and requested both parties to 
prepare and submit briefs on the motion. The 
State then suggested rather than wait for the 
court's ruling on the motion, appellant should 
proceed to present his case. In response, 
appellant explained that only if the court 
denied his motion would he then call expert 
witnesses to refute the State's claim of suffi-
cient independent evidence.. The court there-
upon continued the balance of the trial to 
January 30, 1986. In a minute entry dated 
December 19, 1985, the date of trial, the court 
recorded: 
Prosecution evidence was presented. 
Attorneys will submit briefs by 
January 24, 1986 for Judge to det-
ermine admissability [sic] of certain 
evidence presented. Court's deter-
mination of admissability (sic] will 
determine whether or not defense 
evidence needs to be presented. 
Further hearing and/or disposition 
scheduled for January 30,1986. 
In a decision dated January 23, 1986, the 
court denied appellant's motion to exclude 
and admitted the blood test result into evid-
ence. When trial reconvened on January 30, 
appellant, in light of the court's ruling, 
offered no evidence. The court then found the 
allegations in the petition to be true and 
entered judgment against appellant. 
The trial court clearly reserved any finding 
whether sufficient evidence existed, indepen-
dent of the blood test, to find appellant in 
violation of section 41-6-44(1). In its find-
ings and decree, the court determined appel-
lant was under the influence of alcohol based 
solely on a blood alcohol levd of .18%. 
The majority opinion, in light of the trial 
court's failure to do so, proceeds to make its 
own finding of sufficient independent evidence 
to affirm the judgment. However, it is not the 
function of this Court to make findings of 
fact. Rucker v. Da/ton, 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 
1979). Nor is it the function of "an appellate 
court to decide disputed questions of fact in 
the first instance and then choose between 
affirmance and reversal by testing its factual 
conclusion against that which the trial court 
might have or ... must have reached for it to 
issue the judgment it did." Nicpoa v. Nicpon, 
9 Mich. App. 373. 157 N.W.2d 464, 467 
(1968). (Emphasis in original.) Jttthorriiie 
function .of this Court is to rcvie*rabc*Tecord/ 
to^dctermine^ whe^er.. substantial. evidence 
existi'Td^nipport'the trial court's findings! 
Rdm&wssd vrRussch\ 649 P.2d 26 (Utah 
The judgment in the instant case was based 
solely on the blood test. As the trial court 
failed to make a finding of sufficient indepe-
ndent evidence of intoxication, I would 
remand the case for a new trial. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Cite as 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PER CURIAM: 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the 
Small Claims Department of the Fifth Judicial 
Circuit Court seeking recovery for replacement 
of a damaged sewer lateral. Although plaintiff 
allegedly incurred damages in the amount of 
$2,092.30, he elected to proceed in Small 
Claims Court where his recovery would be 
limited to $1,000.00. Plaintiff originally filed 
affidavits with the court alleging liability of 
Hobbs & Sons, Ken] Building (later changed 
to Arnold Development Co.), Taylorsville-
Bennion Improvement District, and Frank 
Armstrong. At the time of the hearing, plai-
ntiff had effected service on all defendants 
except Arnold Development Company. 
The case was heard on December 23, 1986 
before Judge Pro Tern David Berceau. The 
hearing involved testimony of a number of 
witnesses, including plaintiff Dana Meier and 
his wife, defendant Frank Armstrong, two 
representatives of defendant Taylorsville-
Bennion Improvement District, two represen-
tatives of defendant Hobbs <fe Sons, and a 
witness called by plaintiff. At, the time of the 
hearing, the judge dismissed plaintiffs claims 
against Taylorsville-Bennion Improvement 
District and Frank Armstrong. The case pro-
ceeded against Hobbs & Sons, a sub-
contractor that was involved in installation of 
consult Code • Co's Annotation Service 
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Leger testified that Seldal had in his 
possession a pistol, which, in spite of re-
peated attempts by Seldal, would not fire 
because it did not have a clip. Prior to 
Seldal's death, Seldal had the pistol in his 
belt. A victim of a local burglary testified 
that his home was burglarized on August 
17, 1972, and in addition to the shotgun in 
evidence (against Rogers) a 7.65 mm Ger-
man pistol was taken; however, the clip 
to the weapon was missed by the burglars. 
Upon examination of Seldal's clothing 
after his death, five 7.65 cartridges were 
found by the authorities. When Rogers 
took the Browning shotgun to the pawn-
shop, he also had in his possession an auto-
matic handgun. An employee, Larry John-
ston, testified that he cocked the gun and 
attempted to pull the trigger and that he 
could not make the firing mechanism work. 
Rogers explained that the gun would not 
work without a clip, and it didn't have one. 
Rogers then proceeded to order a clip for 
it. 
At a later time, Rogers told Johnston 
that a business deal they had was off be-
cause there was some "heat" on him. At 
the time Rogers was apprehended by the 
police, in Washington, he informed them 
that Leger was not as deeply involved, in 
the incident, as Christean was, and that 
Christean and Seldal had had a dispute 
over a large quantity of drugs and money. 
Leger had testified that Seldal and Chris-
tean had approximately $800 that they had 
acquired from Trolley Square, and that 
Rogers had requested Seldal divide his 
share. Seldal refused, and Rogers re-
sponded that he'd "get him one of these 
days." 
[7-9] In State v. Sinclair, 15 Utah 2d 
162, 167-168, 389 P.2d 465 (1964), this 
court stated that it may well be that cer-
tain facets of the evidence, considered sep-
arately, could be regarded as not inculpato-
ry and thus be vulnerable to the accused's 
claim that it does not connect him with the 
crime. However, the law does not require 
that the separate bits of evidence be 
viewed in isolation, for it is proper to take 
whatever fragments of proof that can be 
found and piece them together with the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn there-
from in order to fill in the whole mosaic 
a conviction may 
testimony of an 
of the crime. Although 
not rest solely upon the I 
accomplice, all of the circumstances may 
be viewed together to determine the facts. 
The corroborative evidence should be con-
sidered in relation to the other facts ap-
pearing in the evidence of record. If, in 
utilizing this process, it can be accepted by 
reasonable minds, as evidence of substance 
and probative value tending to connect the 
defendant with the crime,| 
of the law are fulfilled. 
case [10] In the instant 
tire record of the trial 
over a period of nineteen^ 
ercd, there emerges suff 
sustain the convictions oii 
we do. 
HENRIOD, C. J., and CROCKETT, EL 
LETT, and TUCKETT, J J., concur. 
the requirements 
when the en-
which extended 
days, is consid-
i|cient evidence to 
appeal, and this 
i«Sy 
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pungemcnt order entered on court's own 
motion, and that expungement of criminal 
record of accused who had been convicted 
of making profit of public money and of 
misusing public funds was within trial 
court's discretion even though expunge-
ment order was entered less than five 
years after the convictions, despite conten-
tion that expungement was not compatible 
with the public interest. 
Affirmed except as to those parts of 
order not in consonance with opinion and, 
as to them, matter remanded with instruc-
tions. 
Henriod, C. J., and Crockett, J., dis-
sented and filed opinions. 
1. Criminal Law C=>982.8, 1222 
In proceeding under statute pertaining 
to power of court to dismiss or discharge 
defendant, previously placed on probation, 
trial court cannot seal criminal record, re-
strict its inspection or bring into operation 
circumstances which would allow response 
to inquiries relating to a conviction of 
crime as though such conviction had never 
occurred; however, trial court can termi-
nate sentence and set aside plea of guilty 
and conviction and can dismiss action, dis-
charge defendant and direct that copies of 
order be dispatched to appropriate agen-
cies. U.GA.I953, 77-35-17. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for or her judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Criminal Law €=>982.l, 1222 
Probation and expungement of one's 
criminal record are neither matters of 
right nor of grace but can only be granted 
when they appear to be compatible with 
the public interest. U.CA.1953, 77-35-17, 
77-35-17.5. 
3. Criminal Law C=>982.8 
In exercise of trial court's broad dis-
cretionary powers to dismiss or discharge 
defendant, trial court must consider intan-
gibles such as character and personality 
traits of defendant, his attitude, his prior 
record, his performance under probation, 
and whether he has acquitted himself well 
in accepting duties that society requires. 
U.CA.1953,1 77-35-17. 
4. Criminal Law €=»II47 
Judgment of trial court expunging a 
defendant's criminal record should not be 
disturbed if trial court's discretion has 
been reasonably used and has not been 
shown to have been abused or exercized in 
an arbitrary or capricious fashion. U.C.A. 
1953, 77-35-17, 77-35-17.5. 
5. Criminal Law <G=>!222 
Proceeding under statute pertaining to 
discharge of a defendant on court's own 
motion and expunging criminal record of 
accused who had been convicted of making 
a profit of public money and of misusing 
public funds were within trial court's dis-
cretion even though expungement order 
was entered less than five years after con-
victions, despite contention that expunge-
ment order was not compatible with the 
public interest. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-17, 77-
35-17,5. 
Vernon B. Roinney, Atty. Gen., M. Reid 
Russell, Earl F. Dorius, Asst. Attys. Gen., 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Walter G. Mann, of Mann & Hadfield, 
Brigham City, for defendant and respon-
dent. 
MAUGHAN, Justice: 
This matter comes to us as an appeal 
from an order of the trial court expunging 
defendant's criminal record, and denying 
the State's motion for a stay of that order. 
The trial court proceeded under the provi-
sions of Section 77-35-17, U.C.A.1953, as 
amended. 
Defendant entered a plea of guilty to 
two charges of felony, viz., making a prof-
it of public money and of misusing public 
funds. Upon motion of the prosecuting at-
torney eight other charges were dismissed. 
The court then sentenced defendant to two 
indeterminate terms in the state penitentia-
ry, the sentences to run concurrently. The 
execution of the sentences was suspended, 
and defendant was placed on probation, 
one of the terms of which was that he 
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serve one year in the county jail. After 
serving four months, the sentencing judge 
modified the terms of the probation by ter-
minating defendant's sentence, and on the 
twenty-first day of August 1972 placed de-
fendant on probation, under the supervi-
sion of the Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole. Thereafter, on October 9, 
1973, pursuant to an affidavit of an offi-
cial of the Adult Probation and Parole De-
partment stating that defendant had suc-
cessfully completed his probation, defend-
ant was discharged therefrom. 
On July 8, 1974, the trial court expunged 
defendant's record. The prosecutor op-
posed the expungement, and later moved 
the court to stay its order for five years so 
as to comply with the provisions of Section 
77-35-17.5, U.CA.1953, as amended L.1973, 
Chapter 198, Section 1; this motion was 
denied. 
The State raises three points on appeal; 
the first two may be combined, they are: 
(1) that the provisions of 77-35-17.5 were 
applicable and should have been applied; 
(2) that the expungement order was not 
compatible with the public interest. De-
fendant countered by claiming that the 
provisions of 77-35-17 were applicable, and 
by challenging the State's right to appeal. 
These two statutes are mutually exclu-
sive. Section 77-35-17.5 does not purport 
to amend or repeal 77-35-17. It is ap-
parent that each deals with a different 
situation. 
Section 77-35-17 (L.1923, Chapter 74, as 
amended by L.1943, Chapter 24) could be 
called the Court's Statute, for it comes into 
operation on the court's own motion or 
that of the prosecutor. The court could 
move on its own motion to expunge, and 
did so pursuant to 77-35-17, as set forth in 
its order. Section 77-35-17.5 could be 
called the Any Person Statute, for it comes 
into operation on the motion of any person 
who can find definition within its terms. 
1. Andrews v. Police* Court of City of Stock-
ton, Cal.App., 123 IMM 12S, VJ9. 
2. State v. Zolautakis, 70 Utah 296, 250 P. 
1044 (1027). 
both statutes in the 
[1] The record shows a confusion of 
initiation of this mat-
ter; this is carried nto the court's order, 
and is not properly a part of the authority 
granted under 77-35^17. Proceeding under 
this statute the court cannot seal the rec-
ord, restrict its inspection, nor bring into 
operation circumstances which would allow 
a response to inquiries relating to a convic-
tion of crime, as th| 
had never occurred, 
pugh such conviction 
The court can termi-
nate the sentence, set aside a defendant's 
plea of guilty, the conviction, dismiss the 
action, and discharge] 
court can also direct 
der be dispatched to 
the defendant. The 
that copies of its or-
appropriate agencies 
—this the court can do in aid of its order, 
that it may have its intended effect. 
The word "expunge" properly describes 
a physical act, not a legal one.1 However, 
in relation to 77-35-1/, it has become fas-
tened in our law by decision and practice 
as descriptive of what the court can do un-
der that statute. In this sense it is expres-
sive of cancel, revoke, set aside. 
[2] Some argument, in the briefs, is 
made concerning whether the subject ac-
tion of the court comes to a defendant as a 
matter of right or of grace. Probation 
and expungement of one's record are nei-
ther matters of right nor of grace, but can 
only be granted when they appear to be 
compatible with the public interest.2 The 
Zolantakis case referred only to suspension 
of sentence and probation, as then provided 
under Chapter 74, L. 923. In 1943, the 
legislature added the List sentence to what 
is now our 77-35-17, providing for an ex-
pungement of one's record "if it be com-
patible with the public interest." This 
court, subsequently addressed itself to that 
ultimate sentence, and said it was "for the 
purpose of permitting |he court under un-
usual circumstances and for good cause to 
expunge the record of crime." 3 
3. State v. Schrcilwr, \2\ Ctali «53. 245 I\2d 
222 (1!>;7J). 
STATE v. CHAMBERS 
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[3,4] In the exercise of these broad 
discretionary powers, which are clearly 
allowed to encourage reformation of 
wrongdoers,4 the court must consider a 
great many intangibles, such as : the char-
acter and personality traits of the defend-
ant, his attitude, his prior record, his per-
formance under probation, and whether he 
has acquitted himself well in accepting the 
duties his society requires. If this discre-
tion is reasonably used, and is not shown 
to have been abused, arbitrary, or capri-
cious, the judgment of the trial court 
should not be disturbed.5 There is no 
showing here that the trial court did not 
properly consider the necessary conditions 
precedent to expungement prior to its or-
der. 
Utah 879 
ELLETT and TUCKETT, JJ., concur. 
HENRIOD, Chief Justice (dissenting): 
[5] The State claims, in its third point, 
that the action of the trial court was not 
compatible with the public interest, and in 
support thereof says that such interest is 
not served in cleansing, so rapidly, the rec-
ord of the criminal acts here involved. 
We are certainly not unmindful of the se-
riousness of crimes, which have as their 
gravamen the failure to honor a public 
trust. However, we cannot support the 
State's claim, in this instance, as a general 
proposition, because of the discretionary 
function of the trial court, and because the 
trial court's performance has not been 
shown to have exceeded its discretionary 
boundaries. The trial court proceeded pur-
suant to statute, and from the record 
presented, we conclude, could have reason-
ably found the expungement to be in the 
public interest. No evidence has been ad-
duced to show the interest of the State to 
have been ill served. 
The trial court is affirmed, except as to 
those parts of its order not in consonance 
with this opinion, and as to them, the mat-
ter is remanded with instructions to render 
an order reflecting the directions herein. 
Xo costs awarded. 
I concur in the dissent with Mr. Justice 
Crockett except as to that part of his opin-
ion suggesting that to seal or expunge 
criminal records is an unpardonable sin, 
and interment of the truth and a distortion 
of justice. I agree generally that expunge-
ment and scaling of public records should 
fly on the wings of a rare bird,—but T 
think it wholesome and responsive to the 
public weal, if, in a given case, it would 
award a young man, for example, the op-
portunity to enlist in the military, possibly 
to die for his country, and doing so, might 
suffer physical, as well as bookkeeping, ex-
pungement, but who somehow might exult 
in some kind of spiritual compensation. 
This in the light of perhaps a Christian in-
terment of a penitent criminal and a for-
givable, non-capital, record that in perpetu-
ity, admittedly would prevent such a par-
don (which traditionally is American and 
human), rather than to pursue a course 
that may burn away his everything on a 
pyre of papyrus in a musty County Court 
House. 
We extend such authority to the Probate 
Court, where the history of an adopted 
child is sealed in silence,1 where the heart-
break of revealing it in some instances 
would be the difference between unmerci-
ful death and merciful life. The pardon-
ing power is an adjunct of what this au-
thor is trying to say. Many a convict is 
entitled to some kind of chance, and if a 
reasonable, properly administered bit of 
nondisclosure would help to get him a job 
without forsaking entirely his heritage and 
country, and without constant police sur-
veillance, rather than promoting recidi-
vism,—I see no sense other than to apply 
the Biblical admonition to go hence and sin 
no more,—and if he follows it, let's forget 
4. Williams v. Harris, 1<M> Utah 387, 149 P. 
LM <>40 (1944). 
5. Williams v. Harris, lbi<l.; State v. Sibert, 
<i Trail LM I!>s. 310 I\2«i 388 (1957). 
I. Title 78-30-15. I'tali Code Annotated, 1953. 
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it. I think the statute points up such a 
philosophy,—but even yet could be more 
viable. 
CROCKETT, Justice (dissenting): 
I dissent, based on two propositions. 
First, the so-called "Order of Expunge-
ment" is, in my opinion, squarely and in-
contestably contrary to Section 77-35-17, 
U.C.A.1953, upon which it expressly states 
it is based. 
Second, and more important, the order 
ignores and violates the explicit mandate 
of Section 77-35-17.5, U.C.A.1953, which 
contains the only authorization for any-
thing resembling the "expungement" which 
is ordered; and which statute provides 
that there must be five years of proper 
conduct before any such order may be en-
tered. 
The material portion of the court's mem-
orandum decision, dated August 6, 1974, 
states: 
The court previously issued its order 
of expungement. The plaintiff State of 
Utah has now filed a motion for an or-
der to stay execution of the expunge-
ment for a period of five years as pro-
vided in Section 77-35-17.5. 
As previously stated in the court's or-
der, the basis for expungement was not 
on the basis of Section 77-35-17.5 but 
[A] was on the basis of the previous 
section not repealed, Section 77-35-17, 
[B] for the reason that the conviction in 
this case occurred prior to the enactment 
of 77-35-17,5, and the court feels that, 
therefore, Section 17-35-17 is the appli-
cable statute and the five years would 
then not be in effect. 
As to how the action was initiated into 
the court, upon whose motion, the court 
took notice of such motion and [C] on 
its own behalf made the order of ex-
pungement. The court feels, therefore, 
that this is not an issue and denies the 
motion for a stay of expungement for 
the five year period under 77-35-17.5. 
It is not without some discomfiture that I 
feel compelled to point out that the empha-
sized portions of the lower court's memo-
randum decision as set forth above are pat-
ently in error. But in those emphasized 
parts, at which I have inserted [A] , [B] , 
and [C] for identification in the discussion 
below, there are misstatements of both law 
and fact. 
The error at [A[] is the statement that 
the expungement oifder is based on Section 
that statute has no 
int, about expungement 
It necessarily follows 
77-35-17, whereas, 
word, nor even a h| 
or sealing records. 
pear that the five-y 
not apply. That 
that the order recites any possible founda-
tion it might have out from under itself. 
The error at [Bj is with the recital that 
the conviction occurred prior to the enact-
ment of Section 77+35-17.5 * to make it ap-
pear waiting period does 
section provides for a 
post-conviction procedure. It obviously 
can be invoked at any time after the con-, 
viction so long as its requirements are met. 
The trial court's statement that the statute 
does not apply because it was enacted after 
the conviction cannot be other than an at-
tempt to avoid the mandate of that section : 
that there must be a five-year period of 
right conduct before any such order can be 
entered. 
The error at 
statement that it 
AC] is that the court's 
jtook notice of such mo-
tion and on its own behalf made the order 
of expungement" seems to be an attempt to 
change the complexion of the proceeding 
in a manner squarely inconsistent with the 
court's recital in its order of July 8, 1974, 
issued just one month previously: 
That the said Richard Arthur Cham-
bers has now petitioned the court to al-
low him to withdraw his plea of guilty 
to said charges and dismiss the informa-
tion in all of said complaints being Crim-
inal Complaints 
pursuant to th^ 
77-35-17 Utah 
and to expunge the record. 
I. Took effect May 8, 1973; see Ch. 198, S.L.U. 
numbered 1370 to 1379, 
provisions of Section 
Code Annotated, 1953, 
1973. 
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One wonders why, in addition to the oth-
er errors pointed out above, the trial court 
felt it necessary to attempt to make it ap-
pear that it was the court, and not Mr. 
Chambers, who initiated this so-called "ex-
pungement" proceeding. 
I suppose nearly everyone has experi-
enced the ego comfort that comes from 
helping someone in trouble; and the pang 
that comes from the necessity of adversely 
affecting his fellowman. I also acknowl-
edge that for anyone who has erred, it is 
commendable and desirable to extend sym-
pathy, encouragement and rehabilitation in 
any wholesome and proper way. 
Xotwithstanding what I have just said, I 
think there are some fundamental and im-
portant considerations which impel the ne-
cessity of pointing out the unlawfulness of 
the procedure taken in this case. I observe 
that this is prompted by no concern about 
Mayor Chambers as an individual (of 
whom I know nothing except as revealed 
in this record). It may seem to some that 
such a procedure is quite all right for some 
eminent person who has erred. But our 
purpose should transcend concern about 
any individual. It should be about the pat-
tern such a proceeding (and its approval 
by this court), sets for the multitude of or-
dinary citizens, and the effect it will have 
upon them; and upon all criminal proce-
dures and criminal records generally. 
The administration of justice entails the 
duty of being faithful and truthful in re-
cording and preserving what is done in 
fulfilling that responsibility. The records 
and history are made up, not only of hero-
ics and accomplishments, but of failures 
and follies, and out of the total experience 
come the lessons, hopefully, for minimizing 
wrongful and encouraging rightful con-
duct. It is my opinion that that desired 
2. Insof.-ir ,is this writer is <«oucerned, neither 
asking nor expecting anyone else to agree, 
I seriously question the wimtom of the ap-
plication of such a statute except in rare 
and exigent circumstances; and particularly 
that portion thereof which purports to au-
thorize a convicted and "expunged" person to 
lie, ifi denying that he has ever been con-
533 P 2d—56 
objective cannot properly be served by of-
ficial distortions to circumvent the law. 
There is no authority cited, and none can be 
found, to support the proposition that the 
trial court has any inherent power to oblit-
erate its records. If it has any power to 
change the official records of conviction, it 
certainly cannot exist except as expressly 
authorized by statute.2 
It was undoubtedly for the foregoing 
reasons that the legislature appears to have 
been quite circumspect in the allowance of 
this sealing or "expungement" of the rec-
ord by including the precaution that it 
should be done only after the expiration of 
a period of five years of following the 
path of rectitude by one convicted of 
crime. This condition has not been com-
plied with because »">p order appealed 
from is patently c o ; e ^ ! y t 0 ^ a w a s e x * 
plained above, it shoun,vA* ;^et aside. (All 
emphasis added.) B m ^ 
irdK\ 
• KIT Nuniit s. *5y. • 
s * • 
Jane PAPPAS, dba J. P. & Company, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
GATEHOUSE CONSTRUCTION, INC., a 
corporation, Defendant and 
Respondent. 
No. 13787. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 31, 1975. 
An interior decorator sued a construc-
tion company on the basis of an alleged 
agreement. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., J., 
gave a judgment of no cause of action, and 
viefed of crime. The mischief that may 
ramify from such falsifying should be ob-
vious. Nevertheless, I bow to the legislative 
will as expressed in Section 77-35-17.5 that 
under proper circumstances after the lapse 
of jive year* the court may aet in accordance 
therewith. 
STATE v. 
Cite as, 659 P.2d 
PETREE 
443 (Utah 1983) 
3. Criminal Law <s=>I 
Utah 443 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
John Wilson PETREE, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 18015. 
Supreme Court of Utah 
Feb. 4, 1983. 
Defendant was convicted in the Fifth 
District Court, Iron County, J. Harlan 
Burns, J., of second-degree murder of a 
15-year-old girl, and he appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Oaks, J., held that, although 
the evidence was sufficient to conclude that 
the death of the victim involved criminal 
activity, the evidence was not sufficient to 
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that de-
fendant caused the victim's death and, even 
if the evidence proved that the defendant 
caused the death, it was manifestly insuffi-
cient to prove that he did so "intentionally 
or knowingly" as was charged in the com-
plaint. 
Conviction reversed. 
Hail, C.J., dissented in an opinion in 
which Durham, J., joined. 
1. Homicide c=>229 
Identification of ring, jacket, sweater 
and pin found with skeleton as those of 
victim by victim's aunt and mother, along 
with testimony that victim was 15 years of 
age, five feet, four inches in height, had no 
dental work but had earlier suffered frac-
ture to left forearm that had healed, was 
sufficient to permit jury to conclude that 
skeletal remains were those of victim. 
2. Homicide c=> 228(1) 
In second-degree murder prosecution, 
corpus delicti was established by evidence 
that death occurred and concealment of 
skeletal remains and unnatural position of 
body provided sufficient evidence from 
which jury could conclude that death result-
ed from criminal activity. 
Supreme Court reverses jury's convic-
tion for insufficient e 
dence, taken in light 
159.2(7) 
kidence only when evi-
most favorable to ver-
dict, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherent-
ly improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained reasonable doubt that de-
fendant committed crjime of which he was 
convicted. 
4. Criminal Law c=>li44.13(2) 
In fulfillment of its duty to review 
evidence and all inferences which may be 
drawn from it in light most favorable to 
verdict, reviewing court will stretch eviden-
tiary fabric as far as it| 
not mean that court 
will go, but this does 
tan take speculative 
leap across remaining gap between pre-
sumption of innocence and proof of guilt in 
order to sustain verdict. 
5. Homicide <s=»230, 234(8) 
Evidence that defendant was last per-
son seen with victim before she disap-
peared, that defendant left town on day 
after victim disappeared and that defend-
ant had made statement referring entirely 
or almost entirely to descriptions of a 
strange dream was insufficient to establish 
beyond reasonable doubt that, even if de-
fendant caused victim's death, he did so 
"intentionally or knowingly" as was 
charged in complaint for second-degree 
murder. U.C.A.1953, 7ft -5-203(1 Xa). 
Scott Jay Thorley, Patrick H. Fenton, 
Cedar City, for defendant and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, Aity. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and respondent. 
OAKS, Justice: 
A jury convicted defendant of second de-
gree murder of a fifteen-year-old girl who 
was his high school classmate. He was 
sentenced to five years to life, and entered 
upon service of his sentence. On this ap-
peal, he urges that the ev dence was insuffi-
cient to show that the crime was committed 
or that he committed it. 
evidence was essentially 
parties disagree on the 
The prosecution's 
undisputed. The 
inferences to be 
drawn from it. The facts are unique. 
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On July 2, 1980, a man who was other-
wise unrelated to the events of this case 
uncovered a human skeleton by a row of 
trees along a fence line in the large back-
yard behind his rented home in Cedar City. 
The skeleton was about 30 inches below the 
surface of the ground in an old carrot pit 
beneath a wooden trap door covered by a 
mound of earth. The police, who were noti-
fied immediately, concluded from the posi-
tion of the skeleton that the body had been 
placed in the pit on its chest with the hips 
bent forward and the legs and arms folded 
over the back of the body. Along with the 
skeleton; they discovered a ring, a jacket, a 
sweater with a pin attached, blue jeans, 
female underclothing, and a pair of boxer 
shorts. The medical examiner concluded 
that the skeleton was that of a female 
between 14 and 17 years of age, approxi-
mately 5 feet 2 inches in height (plus or 
minus 2 inches). The left forearm had a 
thickened area indicating a healed fracture. 
The teeth contained no dental work. Nei-
ther the time nor the cause of death could 
be determined from the skeletal remains. 
[1] Phyllis Ady, age 15, was reported 
missing at 1:00 a.m. on December 13, 1977, 
just over two and one-half years before the 
skeleton was discovered. At that time, she 
was residing with her aunt and uncle, the 
Westmans, who lived approximately one 
block from where the body was found. 
Mrs. Westman and Betty Ady, the victim's 
mother, identified the ring, jacket, sweater, 
and pin found with the skeleton as Phyllis's. 
On the basis of that identification and their 
testimony that Phyllis was 15 years of age, 
5 feet 4 inches in height, had no dental 
work, but had earlier suffered a fracture of 
the left forearm that had healed, the jury 
had ample evidence to conclude that the 
skeletal remains were those of Phyllis Ady. 
[2] The evidence summarized above also 
met the requirement of corpus delicti, 
which, we have said, "requires only that the 
State present evidence [1] that the injury 
specified in the crime occurred, and [2] that 
such injury was caused by someone's crimi-
nal conduct." State v. Knoefler, Utah, 563 
P.2d 175,176 (1977). Accord: State v. Kim-
bel, Utah, 620 P.2d 515, 517 (1980); State v. 
Cazier, Utah, 521 P.2d 554, 555 (1974). In 
this case, the "injury" in the first part of 
the definition is the death of a human be-
ing. As for the second requirement, it is 
unnecessary to show cause of death or to 
provide evidence on the specific degree of 
homicide. The State need only present evi-
dence that the death resulted from criminal 
conduct rather than by accident or from 
natural causes. "The criminal agency 
causing death may be proved by circum-
stantial evidence and the reasonable infer-
ences to be drawn therefrom." People v. 
Miller, 71 Cal.2d 459, 78 Cal.Rptr. 449, 459, 
455 P.2d 377, 387 (1969). That was done in 
this case. The concealment of the skeletal 
remains and the unnatural position of the 
body provided sufficient evidence from 
which the jury could conclude that Phyllis 
Ady died from criminal activity. 
[3] This appeal turns on whether there 
was sufficient evidence for the jury to con-
vict defendant of the crime of second de-
gree murder for "intentionally or knowing-
ly" causing the death of Phyllis Ady. In 
considering that question, we review the 
evidence and all inferences which may rea-
sonably be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury. We 
reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, 
is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently im-
probable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the de-
fendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. State v. Kerekes, Utah, 622 
P.2d 1161, 1168 (1980); State v. Lamm, 
Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980); State v. 
Gorlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 761, 762 (1979); 
State v. Daniels, Utah, 584 P.2d 880, 882-83 
(1978); State v. Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d 
216, 219 (1976). 
[4] In view of what is said in the dissent 
on this subject, we deem it desirable to 
emphasize that notwithstanding the pre-
sumptions in favor of the jury's decision 
this Court still has the right to review the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
verdict. The fabric of evidence against the 
defendant must cover the gap between the 
STATE v. 
Cite as, 659 P.2d 
presumption of innocence and the proof of 
guilt. In fulfillment of its duty to review 
the evidence and all inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from it in the light 
most favorable to the verdict, the reviewing 
court will stretch the evidentiary fabric as 
far as it will go. But this does not mean 
that the court can take a speculative leap 
across a remaining gap in order to sustain a 
verdict. The evidence, stretched to its ut-
most limits, must be sufficient to prove the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State in re J.S.H., Utah, 642 P.2d 
386 (1982); State v. Kourbelas, Utah, 621 
P.2d 1238, 1240 (1980). 
[5] Viewed in the light most favorable 
to the jury's verdict, the evidence against 
the defendant was as follows. At the time 
Phyllis disappeared, she and defendant 
were both 15 years of age. They lived 
about a half block apart on 900 West in 
Cedar City, she with the Westmans and he 
with his mother. They attended the same 
school, but they apparently did not have a 
dating relationship. Phyllis's aunt testified 
that before December 12, 1977, defendant 
had been to their home on only one occa-
sion, the day before, when he merely came 
to the door to inquire if Phyllis was home. 
As she was driven past defendant's house 
at about 6:00 p.m. on December 12, Phyllis 
asked to be let off. Mrs. Westman ob-
served defendant, who had been sitting on 
his porch, walk out to meet Phyllis in the 
road. Mrs. Westman never saw Phyllis 
again. When Phyllis had not come home at 
about 9:00 or 9:30 that evening, Mrs. West-
man went to defendant's home but found 
no one there. Sometime between 10:30 
p.m. and midnight, she returned and, when 
defendant answered the door, asked about 
Phyllis's whereabouts.1 He replied that he 
did not know, that she had left him and 
gone with a blonde long-haired fellow de-
fendant did not know. At 1:00 a.m., Mrs. 
Westman reported Phyllis missing. 
On the evening of December 12, before 
8:00, defendant telephoned his sister in Las 
l. Neither defendant's mother nor the man who 
boarded with them nor Mrs. Westman noted 
anything unusual about defendant's appeur-
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Vegas. He told her that "he was getting a 
hassle at home and in school and he wanted 
to come down." He phoned again the next 
morning. His sister then drove to Cedar 
City, picked him up about noon, and drove 
him back to Las Vegis. Defendant then 
stayed with his sister and her husband in 
Las Vegas for about four days. 
Aside from whatever inference might be 
drawn from the fact that defendant was 
the last jKjrson seen wiih Phyllis before she 
disappeared and the fact that he left Cedar 
City the day after she disappeared, the only 
evidence of defendant's 
the second degree were : 
to three family members during his visit in 
Las Vegas and a statement he made to a 
girl friend two years later. There was no 
other evidence of admissions, no physical 
evidence, and no motive for the homicide. 
All of defendant's statements to familv 
guilt of murder in 
statements he made 
experience he had 
to Las Vegas. His 
members concerned an| 
during his four-day visi 
sister and her husband heard him screaming 
in the night, before midnight. Concluding 
that he was having a nightmare, they took 
him into the kitchen to 
various witnesses' accounts of what was 
said are critical, and ape therefore quoted 
here in their entirety. 
Alisa Backstoce, defendant's sister, testi-
fied as follows: 
Q. Mrs. Backstoce, 
substance and effect 
pan you tell me in 
what was said and 
by whom in this conversation around 
your kitchen table? 
A. We asked JohnrW what his night-
mares was about. He said he was having 
a nightmare about walking with a girl 
and she slapped him and that's all he 
remembered, and then waking up taking 
a bath and her folks, the girl's folks 
pounding on the doop wanting to know 
where she was. 
Q. All right. Did hfe say anything else 
about the girl, othejr than just what 
you've told us? 
ance or demeanor when 
ous limes between 9:00 
December 12. 
they saw him at vari-
p.m. and midnight on 
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A. Later he said he thought he had hurt 
or killed a girl, but he wasn't sure. 
In context, and by its literal terms, this 
testimony clearly referred to the content of 
Johnny's (defendant's) dream, although the 
last quoted answer might be subject to the 
interpretation that it referred to an actual 
occurrence. 
The testimony of James Backstoce, which 
is quoted in the footnote,2 clearly refers 
solely to the defendant's explanation of the 
dream that had awakened him. In content, 
it is consistent with his wife's account. 
Robert Petree, defendant's brother, testi-
fied that he went to the home in Las Vegas 
during his brother's four-day visit to tell 
him that the Cedar City Police were looking 
for him to question him about the disap-
pearance of a young girl. Robert told his 
brother he was going to return him to Ce-
dar City. The testimony continued as fol-
lows: 
Q. All right. What happened, then, af-
ter that; was there anything further 
said? 
A. Yes. Alisa told me about these 
nightmares that she had been woken up. 
I don't remember how many times or 
what different nights. But she said that 
she had been awoken by his screaming in 
the night. 
Q. All right. Did you have any further 
conversation about that with your broth-
er? 
A. Yes, sir. I asked him, you know, was 
there something wrong or was something 
bothering him. 
2. A. We all sit down at the kitchen table and 
discussed what had disturbed him to \*ake 
him up like that 
[Here followed several questions and m-
swers about the physical surroundings w( >re 
the conversation took place and who was 
present, as well as defense counsel's objec-
tion, denied, on admissibilitv The testimon\ 
then continued as follows ] 
Q Mr Backstoce, again, what was said and 
by whom at this conversation^ 
A The things we were discussing with 
Johnny and, of course, the girl that was miss-
ing And during the discussion— 
Q Okay, would you please tell us who said 
what 
A Well, John said that he was walking the 
girl home and the girl slapped him and that 
Q. What did he tell you? 
A. Well, he proceeded to tell me that he 
was walking through a field with—I took 
it as a young girl. He didn't say what 
girl or who it was, but she slapped him. 
He blacked out. And then he goes on 
from there to say about the dreams. 
Q. Okay, what did he tell you about the 
dreams? 
A. Okay. The dream, that was describ-
ed to me from him, and my sister both, 
that— 
Q. What did he tell you about the 
dream, not what your sister told you, but 
what did he tell you? 
A. What he told me about the dream, 
that when he blacked out and he started 
to dream that he—his words were he 
thought he hurt her. He thought he 
might have killed her. 
In context, it is clear that the statements 
related in Robert's testimony were entirely 
concerned with defendant's dream and not 
with actual events.3 This was further em-
phasized in the cross-examination as fol-
lows: 
Q. Now if I understand you correctly, 
you have been sitting here repeating 
what Mr. Petree told you about a dream 
he had had, is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
The only other evidence of defendant's 
guilt came in the testimony of Debra Wil-
son, a girl who had dated defendant in Las 
Vegas or California in the winter of 1980, 
« 
was the last thing he remembered till he 
woke up taking a bath in the tub 
Contrary to the interpretation in the dissent, 
the first answer quoted here makes clear that 
the entire testimony related to the content of 
defendant's dream. 
3. This is further authenticated by Robert Pe-
tree's unambiguous and repeated testimony to 
the court during a hearing out of the presence 
of the jury' on defendant's unsuccessful conten-
tion that the "admission" was inadmissible be-
cause the State had not proved the corpus 
delicti In this hearing, Petree testified that all 
of the statements he had repeated from the 
defendant "came out of one of Johnnys 
dreams " 
STATE v. 
Cite as, 659 P.2d 
more than two years after Phyllis disap-
peared. She testified that during one of 
their conversations defendant told her that 
he had gotten into a fight with a girl in 
Utah. He mentioned no names, dates, or 
other details. His statement about this 
event, as described in the witness's testimo-
ny, which is quoted in full in the footnote,4 
was so inconsequential to this witness that 
she said it "just passed through one ear and 
out the other." In short, it could have 
referred to any of a variety of real or 
exaggerated events in the dating life of a 
teenager. There was no other evidence of 
guilt. 
In resfwnse, the defense entered a stipu-
lation that none of the "items" recovered 
from the clothing in the pit or from a 
nearby shed matched the hair samples tak-
en from the defendant. A girl friend of 
Phyllis's testified that when Phyllis left her 
at about 6:00 on the evening of December 
12 she said she was on her way to meet a 
Ken Perkins, with whom the witness was 
casually acquainted as a person who lived 
nearby who wanted to date Phyllis.5 Other 
defense witnesses testified that they 
thought they had seen Phyllis alive at vari-
ous places in the months following her dis-
appearance. In the posture of this appeal, 
we must assume that the jury placed no 
credence in any of this testimony. On the 
other hand, contrary to the suggestion in 
the dissent, the fact that the jury did not 
believe the defense implication that Perkins 
was a viable sus{>ect adds little or no 
strength to the case against the defendant. 
Though the identification of another person 
as a probable perpetrator may help a de-
fendant in securing an acquittal, his failure 
4. Q Again, Miss Wilson, can you tell me in 
substance and effect what was said and by 
whom in this conversation 
A He had told me that he had gotten in a 
fight with a girl in Utah He didn't mention 
any names And he came home and he 
couldn't remember nothing afterwards 
Q Ail right, did he say anything else about 
what condition he was in when he came 
home0 
A Just that he remembered getting in a 
tight and I guess he had Wood on his shirt, 
thdt was what was mentioned, and he 
couldn't lemember nothing 
Defend-
fall on the 
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to identify another suspect provides no evi-
dence of his guilt. A defendant must be 
convicted on the strength of the evidence 
against him, not on the weakness of the 
evidence against someone else] 
ant's conviction must stand or 
content of and inferences that can be drawn 
from the prosecution's evidence. 
The verdict of guilty of murder in the 
second degree rests entirely on testimony of 
defendant's meeting Phyllis on the street on 
the evening she disappeared, his trip to Las 
Vegas on the day following, and on three 
witnesses' testimony of defendant's state-
ments to them in Las Vegas. Interpreted 
most favorably to the prosecution, those 
statements refer entirely or almost entirely 
to defendant's descriptions of his strange 
dream. The testimony thai he told a date 
two years later that he once nad a fight 
with a girl in Utah adds nothing of sub-
stance on this issue. 
While the evidence was sufficient for the 
jury to conclude that the death of Phyllis 
Ady involved criminal activity (the corpus 
delicti), the evidence was not sufficient to 
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that de-
fendant caused Phyllis Ady's death. Even 
if the evidence proved that defendant 
caused her death, it was manifestly insuffi-
cient to prove that he did so Hintentionally 
or knowingly," as was charged in this com-
plaint for murder in the second degree. 
U.C.A., 1953, § 76-5-203(lXa) 
The conviction is reversed 
fendant is ordered discharged 
and the de-
from custody. 
STEWART and HOWE, JJi concur. 
I. The record shows that Perkins had resided 
between the lot where the skeleton was found 
and the McDonald's restaurant J whose parking 
lot abutted that lot in the rear (along the fence 
line by the pit) In rebuttal, the prosecution 
showed that Perkins had a record of narcotics 
offenses, that his place of residence had been 
torn down the preceding August, and that he 
had moved awav from Cedar C ty prior to that 
time. The prosecution introduced a "mug 
shot" of Perkins, and the witness who had 
mentioned him (Phylhs's girl friend) was un-
able to identif\ it 
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HALL, Chief Justice (dissenting): 
I premise my dissent upon the following 
time-honored rule of appellate review: 
It is the exclusive function of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses, and it is not 
within the prerogative of this Court to 
substitute its judgment for that of the 
factfinder.1 [Emphasis added.] 
The main opinion reaches a conclusion con-
trary to that of the jury and trial court by 
substituting the judgment of this Court, as 
to the weight and sufficiency of the evi-
dence for that of the jury, in direct contra-
vention of the foregoing. 
The standard of review to which this 
Court is bound when faced with insufficien-
cy of evidence claims was very recently 
stated in State v. McCardell* 
This Court will not lightly overturn the 
findings of a jury. We must view the 
evidence properly presented at trial in the 
light most favorable to the jury's verdict, 
and will only interfere when the evidence 
is so lacking and insubstantial that a rea-
sonable man would not possibly have 
reached a verdict beyond a reasonable 
doubt. We also view in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict those facts 
which can be reasonably inferred from 
the evidence presented to it. "Thus, in-
tent to commit [a crime] . . . may be 
found from proof of facts from which it 
reasonably could be believed that such 
was defendant's intent." [Citations omit-
ted.] 
This Court also adheres to the general 
appellate rule that a trial court's judgment 
has a presumption of validity in an appel-
late court. We held in Burton v. Zions 
Cooperative Mercantile Institution? 
There is a presumption that the judgment 
of the trial court was correct, and every 
reasonable intendment must be indulged 
1. State v Lamm. Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 
(1980). 
2. Utah, 652 P 2d 942 (1982). See also State v. 
Romero, Utah. 554 P.2d 216 (1976); State v. 
Lamm, supra n. 1. 
in favor of it; the burden of affirmative-
ly showing error is on the party complain-
ing thereof. 
I have no quarrel with the proposition 
that this Court has the prerogative to deter-
mine the sufficiency of the evidence. How-
ever, in doing so, the main opinion fails to 
follow the more fundamental rule that re-
quires us to view the evidence and all infer-
ences to be drawn therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the jury verdict. Rather, it 
assumes the role of fact-finder, surveying 
the evidence in the record and drawing 
therefrom independent conclusions as to its 
weight, sufficiency and effect. Such is not 
the role of this Court. 
The main opinion concludes that a rela-
tionship did not exist between defendant 
and the victim by reason of the fact that 
defendant had visited the victim's home on 
only one occasion prior to December 12, 
1977. This conclusion does not reflect a 
view of the evidence in the light most fa-
vorable to the jury's verdict. The fact that 
defendant's "one" visit occurred the very 
day before the victim disappeared could 
reasonably have prompted the jury to infer 
that some form of relationship was develop-
ing or had developed between defendant 
and the victim. 
In an attempt to cast doubt as to defend-
ant's being the perpetrator of the offense, 
the defense presented evidence that Miss 
Ady's plans on the evening of her disap-
pearance included a visit to one Ken Per-
kins. The defense intended thereby to im-
plicate Ken Perkins as the person described 
by defendant as having long, blonde hair, 
with whom the victim allegedly left on the 
eve of her disappearance. 
The testimony regarding Ken Perkins 
was shown to be unreliable and inconse-
quential, and therefore apparently disbe-
lieved by the jury.4 Inasmuch as this was 
3. 122 Utah 360, 259 P.2d 514, 518(1952). See 
also People v. Miller, 78 Cal.Rptr. 449. 78 Cal. 
Rptr. 449. 455 P 2d 377 (1969). 
4. Christa AJlred's testimony, being the only tes-
timony regarding Miss Ady's acquaintance 
with Ken Perkins, was countered by the follow-
ing: The State showed that the house where 
STATE v. 
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the only evidence presented by the defense 
of an alternative suspect, and it failed, de-
fendant, being the last person positively 
seen with the victim, was left as the only 
possible and viable suspect. Therefore, con-
trary to the conclusion reached in the main 
opinion, the failure of defendant's evidence 
to implicate Perkins does add strength to 
the evidence against defendant as the 
perpetrator of the crime. 
The State's evidence showed that defend-
ant abruptly left town the very day the 
victim was reported missing. According to 
the record, defendant called his sister in Las 
Vegas, Nevada, on the night of December 
12, 1977, at approximately 8:00 p.m. (only 
two hours after he had been seen with the 
victim), and again on the following morn-
ing. He told her of his distressful situation 
at home and at school and asked her if she 
would come at once and get him. She 
drove from Las Vegas that very day (De-
cember 13), and took defendant back to her 
home, where he remained until he was re-
turned to Cedar City by his older brother 
four days later. 
The unexplained and undisputed evidence 
of defendant's departure from Cedar City 
immediately following the victim's disap-
pearance gives rise to an inference of his 
guilt.5 This Court has held: 
Flight and concealment immediately 
following the commission of a crime are 
both elements which may be considered 
as evidence of implication in that crime.6 
The jury could therefore draw an inference 
of guilt from defendant's abrupt departure 
from the state. 
Perkins had resided had been torn down since 
early August, 1977, and that Perkins had left 
Cedar City sometime prior to that date. The 
State also introduced into evidence a mug shot 
of Perkins, which was identified by the Cedar 
City Police Chief. Miss Allred, having been 
called to the witness stand once and having 
then testified that she knew who Perkins was 
and what he looked like, was called back to the 
stand and asked if she could identify the person 
in the mug shot. She could not. Her failure to 
identify the individual as Perkins cast a shade 
of unreliability on her information and testimo-
ny regarding him. Furthermore, the mug shot 
revealed Perkins' hair color to be black, thus 
precluding an inference that Perkins was the 
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The main opinion draws thje conclusion 
that defendant's statements to his relatives 
concerning the content and puse of his 
nightmares were not actual admissions, but 
rather were mere accounts of dreams bear-
ing insufficient weight to support an infer-
ence of defendant's guilt. However, it is 
not this Court's prerogative to draw such 
conclusions and thereby substitute its judg-
ment as to the weight and sufficiency of 
evidence for that of the jury. The jury, 
upon weighing the testimony regarding de-
fendant's statements in conjunction with 
the other evidence, deemed the statements 
to be supportive of the inference of guilt. 
Furthermore, the conclusion that defend-
ant's statements were mere accounts of 
dreams, rather than of an actual occur-
rence, is not sup|>orted by the record, nor 
does it reflect a review of the facts in "a 
light most supportive of the findings of the 
trier of fact." Also, the main opinion as-
sumes that the accounts of his dreams could 
not, under any circumstances give rise to 
an inference of guilt. Here again, it is not 
for this Court to make such an assumption. 
Particularly is this so under (he facts and 
circumstances of this case. 
A thorough and exacting 
record, in a light most favorable 
verdict, reveals certain 
inaccuracies in the analysis of| 
in the main opinion regardi 
statements. The first witness! 
defendant's confessions was 
stoce, the defendant's brother-
rjeview of the 
to the jury 
nconsistencies and 
the evidence 
defendant's 
to testify ot 
James Back-
in-law.7 The 
same person described by defendant as the one 
with whom he last saw the victim. 
5. See State v. Hardison, N.M.App., 467 P.2d 
1002 (1970); State v. McCormlck, 28 Or.App. 
821, 561 P.2d 665 (1977). 
6. State v. Simpson, 120 Utah I 596, 236 P.2d 
1077. 1079 (1951). See also Sthte v. Marasco. 
81 Utah 325, 17 P.2d 919 (1933^ 
Back 
hht 
. The pertinent part of Mr 
mony reads as follows: 
Q. Mr. Backstoce. again, wl 
by whom at this conversation 
A. The things we were 
Johnny and, of course, the ^ir^f 
inn And during the discussipn 
stoce s testi-
was said and 
cjiscussing with 
that was miss-
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main opinion quotes Mr. Backstoce's testi-
mony and states that it "clearly refers sole-
ly to the defendant's explanation of the 
dream that had awakened him." This 
statement is not accurate. Mr. Backstoce 
indicated that defendant, himself and his 
wife (defendant's sister) had a discussion 
concerning the missing girl (Phyllis Ady) 
after being awakened by one of defendant's 
nightmares. In the context of that discus-
sion, i.e., regarding Phyllis Ady, Mr. Back-
stoce testified that defendant related to 
them the following condemning statement: 
"Well, John [defendant] said that he was 
walking the girl home and the girl slapped 
him and that was the last thing he remem-
bered till he woke up taking a bath in the 
tub." Contrary to the conclusion reached in 
the main opinion, no mention at all was 
made of dreams. The statements in the 
conversation refer to an actual occurrence, 
and Phyllis Ady is definitely the subject of 
the conversation. 
The next witness called by the State to 
testify concerning defendant's statements 
was Alisa Backstoce, defendant's sister.8 
Although the main opinion concludes that 
her testimony refers entirely to the content 
of the defendant's dreams, it admits that 
part of her testimony could be interpreted 
to refer to an actual occurrence. Mrs. 
Backstoce's testimony regarding the con-
versation between herself, her husband and 
defendant at the kitchen table after his 
second nightmare, is for the most part con-
sistent with that of her husband. However, 
unlike her husband's testimony, she refers 
to the matter as a dream. It is noted, also, 
that her testimony includes an additional 
part of the dream that Mr. Backstoce did 
Q. Okay, would you please tell us who said 
what. 
A. Well, John said that he was walking the 
girl home and the girl slapped him and that 
was the last thing he remembered till he 
woke up taking a bath in the tub. [Emphasis 
added.] 
8. Mrs. Backstoce's testimony, in pertinent part, 
reads: 
Q. Mrs. Backstoce, can you tell me in sub-
stance and effect what was said and by 
whom in this conversation around your 
kitchen table? 
not mention: the girl's folks had come to 
defendant's house searching for her. This 
correlates with the fact that Mrs. Westman 
went to the defendant's house on the eve of 
December 12 in search of Phyllis Ady. 
Perhaps the most important part of Mrs. 
Backstoce's testimony is that part which the 
main opinion regards as being subject to 
interpretation that it refers to an actual 
occurrence. After her account of her 
brother's statements concerning his night-
mares, Mrs. Backstoce was asked if the 
defendant said anything else about the girl. 
Her answer was: "Later he said he thought 
he had hurt or killed a girl, but he wasn't 
sure." (Emphasis added.) This statement, 
when considered in light of Mr. Backstoce's 
testimony that the conversation at the 
kitchen table involved the "missing girl," 
could reasonably and justifiably be inter-
preted as referring to an actual occurrence 
involving the victim. Notwithstanding this 
interpretation is most consistent with the 
jury's verdict, and furthermore is acknowl-
edged by the main opinion, it is rejected by 
the Court. 
The third witness to testify regarding the 
alleged admissions was the defendant's 
brother, Robert Petree. Robert Petree, 
who was living in California at the time of 
the incident, was contacted by the Cedar 
City Police and questioned as to the where-
abouts of his brother, the defendant. He 
was informed that his brother was being 
sought out for questioning regarding the 
disappearance of Phyllis Ady, and he 
pledged his assistance in finding his brother 
and returning him to Cedar City. 
A. We asked Johnny what his nightmares 
was about. He said he was having a night-
mare about walking with a girl and she 
slapped him and that's all he remembered, 
and then waking up taking a bath and her 
folks, the girl's folks pounding on the door 
wanting to know where she was. 
Q. Ail right. Did he say anything else about 
the girl, other than just what you've told us? 
A. Later he said he thought he had hurt or 
killed a girl, but he wasn't sure. [Emphasis 
added.] 
STATE v. 
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He eventually found his brother at his 
sister's house in Las Vegas, Nevada. Upon 
confronting defendant, he told him that the 
police were searching for him in connection 
with the Phyllis Ady disappearance and 
that he was going to have to return to 
Cedar City. Defendant expressed his un-
willingness to return. 
In defendant's presence, his sister told 
Robert Petree about the nightmares. A 
conversation then ensued between defend-
ant and Robert. Robert did not ask him 
specifically about the dreams; he rather 
asked him what was bothering him. (Keep 
in mind that Robert had just informed de-
fendant that the |x>lice were searching for 
him in connection with the Phyllis Ady mat-
ter.) Defendant's response, as Robert re-
lates it, was not in reference to a dream at 
this point in the conversation.9 Walking 
through the field, being slapped and black-
ing out appear to be the facts. After these 
facts are stated, the account of the dreams 
begins.10 The account is incoherent and 
consequently very difficult to interpret.11 
It is not clear whether defendant blacked 
out in his dream or blacked out and then 
began to dream. The State argued that the 
black out occurred at the time defendant 
killed Phyllis Ady, and that the dreams that 
he had hurt or possibly killed her were mere 
fill-ins of the actual event. This reasoning 
is conceivable, especially in light of the tes-
timony given by Debra Wilson concerning a 
later statement made by defendant, which 
was totally unrelated to the dreams, infra. 
9. "Well, he proceeded to tell me that he was 
walking through a field with—I took it as a 
young girl. He didn't say what girl or who it 
was, but she slapped him. He blacked out. 
And then he goes on from there to say about 
the dreams." 
10. "And then he goes on from there to say 
about the dreams." (Emphasis added.) 
11. "What he told me about the dream, that 
when he blacked out and he started to dream 
that he—his words were he thought he hurt 
her. He thought he might have killed her." 
(Emphasis added.) 
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The main opinion emphasizes the fact 
that on cross-examination, Robert Petree 
told defense counsel that his testimony was 
the account of a dream that defendant had. 
However, the foregoing analysis of his tes-
timony, being an analysis favoring the 
jury's verdict, reveals that only a part of his 
answers actually referred to the defend-
ant's dreams; the remainder were clearly 
outside the dream context. 
Also proffered by the State as an admis-
sion of defendant's guilt was a statement 
he made to Debra Wilson.12 Miss Wilson 
had dated defendant in 1979 and 1980 while 
he was living in California. She testified 
that he told her he had gotten into a fight 
with a girl in Utah, and that he had gone 
home afterwards and could not remember 
anything. No mention was made of any 
dreams. Defendant simply related the inci-
dent as an actual occurrence. 
The main opinion considers Debra Wil-
son's testimony to be inconsequential, and 
furthermore, determines that it "adds noth-
ing of substance on this issue." I cannot 
agree. When considered along with the 
testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Backstoce and 
Robert Petree, and when viewed in a light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict, it rea-
sonably supports an inference of defend-
ant's guilt. Because there was no doubt 
that defendant was relating an actual oc-
currence to Debra Wilson, it would have 
been reasonable for the jury to conclude 
that defendant's statements to the other 
three witnesses concerning an altercation 
with a female and a black out, or lapse of 
Q. Again, Miss Wilson, can you tell me in 
substance and effect what was said and by 
whom in this conversation 
A. He had told me that he had gotten in a 
fight with a girt in Utah. He didn't mention 
any names. And he came home and he 
couldn't remember nothing aftenvards. 
Q. All right, did he say anything else about 
what condition he was in when he came 
home? 
A. Just that he remembered getting in a 
fight and I guess he had blood on his shirt; 
that was what was mentioned, and he 
couldn't remember nothing. [Emphasis add-
12. The relevant portion of Miss Wilson's testi-
mony is as follows. 
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memory, were not mere products of his 
imagination derived from dreams, but rath-
er actual admissions of definite occurrences. 
To sustain such a conclusion would certainly 
not require undue stretching of the eviden-
tiary fabric. 
Although it is not absolutely clear from 
the record that all of defendant's state-
ments referred to an actual occurrence, it 
was clear beyond a reasonable doubt to the 
jury, as they sat and listened first hand to 
the witnesses, that these statements, be 
they accounts of dreams, actual occurrences 
or a mixture of both, implicated defendant 
as the perpetrator of the homicide. This 
Court has noted that: 
[I]t is not the function of an appellate 
court to make findings of fact because it 
does not have the advantage of seeing 
and hearing the witnesses testify.13 [Em-
phasis added.] 
Accordingly, this Court should adopt an in-
terpretation of these statements consistent 
with the jury's findings and ultimate ver-
dict. 
A fact wholly ignored by the main opin-
ion, yet one which definitely lends credence 
to the trial court's judgment, is that de-
fendant was known to have an explosive 
temper. Mr. Paul Jeffries, a tenant at de-
fendant's home, gave testimony of this fact 
on behalf of the State. This fact, coupled 
with the foregoing admissions, permits an 
inference that when defendant was slapped 
by the victim he lost his temper, reacted 
violently and took the victim's life. 
In conclusion, the main opinion suggests 
that even if the evidence were sufficient to 
prove that defendant caused Phyllis Ady's 
death, it is not sufficient to prove that he 
did so "intentionally or knowingly," as re-
quired for a conviction of second degree 
murder. 
13. Rucker v Dalton, Utah, 598 P2d 1336, 1338 
(1979) See also Mendelson v Roland. 66 Utah 
487, 243 P 798(1926) 
14. See State v Murph\. Utah, 617 P2d 399 
(1980), State v Kennedy, Utah, 616 P 2d 594 
(1980), State v Coole\, Utah, 603 P2d 800 
(1979) 
This Court recognizes the elementary 
principle of criminal law that specific intent 
may and ordinarily must, be proven by cir-
cumstantial evidence.14 An appropriate and 
recent articulation of this rule is: 
[I]ntent may be proven and often must be 
proven in criminal prosecution by circum-
stantial evidence and the reasonable in-
ferences to be drawn therefrom. The 
weight to be ascribed to such evidence is 
a determination within the province of 
the jury.15 
This is not a case of first impression in 
this jurisdiction.16 The law in Utah, as well 
as in most jurisdictions, clearly permits a 
conviction of second degree murder and 
proof of the elements thereof based on in-
ferences drawn from surrounding circum-
stances.17 The issue is simply whether the 
facts surrounding this case and the evidence 
proffered by the State provided the jury 
with a reasonable basis from which to draw 
such inferences. 
In the instant case, the State showed that 
Phyllis Ady's body was forced into the car-
rot pit in a reverse fetal position and par-
tially buried to avoid detection. These 
facts certainly permit a reasonable infer-
ence that defendant's conduct was animat-
ed by the specific intent necessary for 
second degree murder. Furthermore, Paul 
Jeffries, a tenant at defendant's home, tes-
tified that defendant had an explosive tem-
per. This fact, coupled with defendant's 
admissions in which a girl had slapped him, 
would support a reasonable inference that 
at the moment he was slapped, and in his 
anger, he formed the intent to kill Phyllis 
Ady or knew that his subsequent conduct 
would result in her death. Viewing the 
evidence and reasonable inferences there-
15. State v Wilkins, 1 Hawaii App 546. 622 
P2d 620, 624 (1981) 
16. State v Canfield, 18 Utah 2d 292. 422 P2d 
196 (1967) 
17. Id See also State v Wilktns, supra n 16, 
State v Woods. 222 Kan 179. 563 P2d 1061 
(1977) 
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from, as well as the inference that an actor 
generally intends the ultimate consequences 
of his acts,18 in a light favorable to the jury 
verdict, defendant has simply failed to show 
that the evidence was "so inconclusive or 
insubstantial that a reasonable person must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt" that 
the State proved intent for second degree 
murder. Therefore, the jury verdict and 
the judgment rendered thereupon should be 
left undisturbed. 
I would affirm the judgment and sen-
tence of the trial court. 
DURHAM, J., concurs in 
opinion of HALL, C.J. 
he dissenting 
( O I KEYNUMBfRSYSTEMj 
!8. State v Walton, Utah, 646 P.2d 689 (1982). 
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consider whether and under what circum-
stances recusal may be required in adminis-
trative adjudications when the specific pro-
visions of section 54-7-1.5 do not apply. 
Plainly, having participated in a rule mak-
ing proceeding does not automatically pre-
clude a commissioner from participating in 
a later, properly conducted adjudication. 
We have considered the other issues 
raised and find their disposition unneces-
sary to the result. The Commission's rule 
is of no force and effect, and its order is 
vacated. The matter is remanded for pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
Jose Antonio LOPEZ, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Fred C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief, Driver 
License Services, Utah Department of 
Public Safety, Defendant and Respon-
dent. 
No. 20112. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 12, 1986. 
Utah State Driver License Division re-
voked driving privileges of driver for peri-
od of one year. The Seventh District 
Court, Carbon County, Richard C. David-
son, J., affirmed the administrative deci-
sion. Driver appealed. The Supreme 
Court, held that: (1) statute providing for 
arrest of one "in actual physical control" of 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol 
and/or drugs was intended by legislature 
to protect public safety and apprehend 
drunken driver before he or she strikes and 
may not be construed to exclude those 
whose vehicles are presently immobile be-
cause of mechanical trouble, and (2) driv-
er's refusal to submit to breath test upon 
rumors that there had been incidents of 
tampering with breathalyzer in the past 
was nevertheless refusal, subjecting de-
fendant to license revocation. 
Affirmed. 
1. Automobiles $^144.2(9) 
In revocation proceeding, Driver Divi-
sion has burden to show that operator of 
vehicle was in actual physical control of 
motor vehicle and that arresting officer 
had grounds to believe that operator was 
under influence of alcohol. 
2. Automobiles <$== 144.2110) 
In trial de novo, district court must 
determine by preponderance of evidence 
whether driver's license was subject to rev-
ocation for driving under the influence of 
alcohol. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10. 
3. Automobiles «= 144.2(3) 
Supreme Court's review of district 
court's determination as to whether driv-
er's license was subject to revocation for 
driving while under the influence of alcohol 
is deferential to trial court's view of evi-
dence unless trial court has misapplied 
principles of law or its findings are clearly 
against weight of evidence. 
4. Automobiles <S=>144.1(1) 
Even if truck was inoperable at time 
that licensee was found sleeping in it and 
arrested, that would not preclude him from 
having "actual physical control" over truck 
so that his driver's license could be revoked 
if he had statutorily prohibited blood alco-
hol content. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10(1, 2). 
5. Automobiles <3=>349 
Statute providing for arrest of one "in 
actual physical control" of vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs 
was intended by legislature to protect pub-
lic safety and apprehend drunken driver 
before he or she strikes and may not be 
construed to exclude those vehicles are 
presently immobile because of mechanical 
trouble. U.C.A.1953, 
10(2). 
6. Automobiles <s= 144.2(10) 
District court's findings that vehicle 
had reached its point of rest under its own 
power and that licensee had failed field 
sobriety test, were supported by competent 
evidence, and would not be disturbed by 
Supreme Court. 
7. Automobiles <®=»144.1(1) 
Refusal to take breathalyzer test sim-
ply means that arrestee was asked to take 
breath test decline to do so of his own 
volition. 
8. Automobiles <£=> 144.2(8) 
Whether or not driver's refusal to take 
breath test is conditional or reasonable 
makes no difference; result is still license 
revocation of one year. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-
44.10. 
9. Automobiles 3=144.1(1) 
Refusal to answer yes or no to request 
to taking breath test is still refusal, for 
purpose of license revocation. U.C.A. 
1953, 41-6-44.10. 
10. Automobiles <s=»144.1(l) 
Driver's licensee admitted that he had 
been requested to submit to breath test 
and that he had refused, invoking sanction 
of revocation of his license. U.C.A.1953, 
41-6-44.10. 
11. Appeal and Error e=»181 
Supreme Court will not review alleged 
error when no objection at all is made at 
trial level. 
LOPEZ v. SCHWENDIMAN Utah 779 
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41-2-19.5, 41-6-44.- ter a trial de novo, the trial court affirmed 
the administrative decision. Lopez appeals 
and contends: (1) it was error to find that 
Lopez was in actual phys cal control of his 
vehicle when he was asleep at the wheel 
and the vehicle was inoperable; (2) his re-
fusal to take a breath test, was reasonable; 
Phil L. Hansen, (Lopez), Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Bruce M. 
Hale, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and respondent 
PER CURIAM: 
The Utah State Driver License Division 
revoked the driving privileges of petitioner 
Lopez for a period of one year pursuant to 
U.C.A., 1953, § 41-6-44.10 (1981 ed.). Af-
and (3) it was error to al ow testimony on 
Lopez's breath test refusal when Lopez did 
not know that he was under arrest We 
affirm. 
At approximately 3:00 am. on March 18, 
1984, Officers Anderson and Schofield 
were separately dispatched to investigate a 
prowler report. En route, Schofield was 
flagged down by an individual who pointed 
to Lopez's truck parked by a public tele-
phone booth adjacent to Sunnyside City 
Hall. The truck's motor was not running. 
There were vehicle tracks from the pickup 
in the freshly fallen snow. When Schofield 
approached the truck, Lopez was sitting in 
the driver's seat with his nead resting on 
the steering wheel. Schofield tapped on 
the window, assisted Lopez in opening the 
door to talk to him, and had to catch him 
when he fell more than stepped out of his 
truck. Schofield smelled alcohol on Lo-
pez's breath. Lopez was drooling, had 
very poor balance, and needed support to 
stand. When asked to produce a driver 
license, Lopez initially handid the officer a 
child's picture. Schofield removed the keys 
from the ignition and had t<|) turn them to 
get them out. 
After Officer Anderson arrived, both of-
ficers asked Lopez to perform several field 
sobriety tests, which he failed. Lopez at 
one point stated, "Was I driv ng, I was just 
waiting for a phone call." Lopez was 
placed under arrest, handcuffed, and 
placed in the patrol car. Both officers tes-
tified that Lopez asked several times what 
he was arrested for. Officer Anderson 
then requested Lopez to submit to a breath 
test to determine the alcohol content in his 
blood. Lopez responded, ' I took your 
tests. I passed your tests.' Lopez was 
transported to the sheriffs station, where 
he was again asked to submit to the breath 
test, was advised that he would be permit-
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ted to have an additional test administered 
by a physician of his own choice, and was 
warned that his refusal to submit to the 
test could result in revocation of his license 
for one year. Lopez did not respond. 
At trial, Lopez stated for the first time 
that his wife had been driving the truck 
when the battery died. He had been wait-
ing in the truck for her to bring thenar to 
tow the truck home. He admitted that he 
had not told the officers about any dead 
battery or dead car. He admitted that he 
understood that he had been arrested for 
driving while under the influence. Lopez 
also testified that he had refused the offi-
cer's request to take the breath test be-
cause he "didn't trust them" and that he 
had conducted the field sobriety tests well' 
enough to prove that he had not been 
drinking. He also confirmed that he had 
been told that he would lose his license if 
he refused. 
From the evidence so adduced, the trial 
court found by a preponderance that there 
was probable cause to arrest Lopez, that he 
had been requested to take the breath test, 
and that he had been warned of the conse-
quences if there was a refusal. The court 
found the arrest proper because Lopez was 
alone in the car, had the keys to the ve-
hicle, "there were tire tracks leading up to 
the vehicle, the vehicle got there apparent-
ly on its own power," and Lopez had failed 
the field sobriety tests. 
[1-3J In a revocation proceeding, the 
Driver License Division has the burden to 
show that the operator of a vehicle was "in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle" 
and that the arresting officer had grounds 
to believe that the operator was then under 
the influence of alcohol. Garcia v. 
Sckwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 652 (Utah 
1982); Ballard v. State, 595 P.2d 1302 
(Utah 1979). In a trial de novo, the district 
court must determine by a preponderance 
of the evidence "whether the petitioner's 
license is subject to revocation undeif the 
provisions of this chapter." §«41-$-44.-
10(2), supra; Garcia, 645 P.2d at 652. Our 
review of that determination is deferential 
to the trial court's view of the evidence 
unless the trial court has misapplied princi-
ples of law or its findings are clearly 
against the weight of the evidence. Id. at 
653. 
Lopez first argues that the Driver Li-
cense Division failed to meet the statutory 
requirements that he had "actual physical 
control" of the vehicle when he was arrest-
ed. Section 41-6-44.10(1) reads in perti-
nent part: 
Any person operating a motor vehicle in 
this state shall be deemed to have given 
his consent to a chemical test or tests of 
his breath, blood, or urine for the pur-
pose of determining whether he was driv-
ing or in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle while having a blood alco-
hpl content statutorily prohibited, or 
while under the influence of alcohol, any 
drug, or combination of alcohol and any 
drug . . . so long as the test is or tests 
are administered at the direction of a 
peace officer having grounds to believe 
that person to have been driving or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while having a blood alcohol content stat-
utorily prohibited, or while under the in-
fluence of alcohol, any drug, or combina-
tion of alcohol and any drug 
Lopez compares his situation to the facts 
of State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d 404, 483 
P.2d 442 (1971), where the driver of the 
vehicle had parked his car completely off 
the road, had turned off the motor, and 
was sleeping. Nothing in that case indi-
cates that the driver was in the driver's 
seat at the time he was found and arrested. 
"Positioning in the driver's seat is an ele-
ment common to all of the cases that have 
found actual physical control of a motion-
less vehicle." State v. Smelter, 36 Wash. 
App. 439, 674 P.2d 690 (1984). See also 
Adams v. State, 697 P.2d 622 (Wyo.1985); 
Huges v. State, 535 P.2d 1023 (Okla.Crim. 
1975); but compare Bearden v. State, 430 
P.2d 844 (Okla.Crim. 1967), where the driver 
lay unconscious on the ground beside his 
pickup truck. The courts upholding convic-
tions in these and similar fact situations 
start out from the premise that as long as 
a person is physically able to assert domin-
LOPEZ v. SCHWENDIMAN 
Cite a* 720 P.2d 778 (Utah 1986) 
ion by starting the car and driving away, at 654; accord Ballard 
he has substantially as much control over 
the vehicle as he would if he were actually 
driving it, Adams v. State, 697 P.2d at 
625. 
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[4,5] Nonetheless, Lopez claims that 
his car was inoperable at the time of his 
arrest and that the statutory burden was 
therefore not borne by the Driver License 
Division as he was unable to start the car 
and drive it away. We note initially that 
Lopez first told this version of the events 
leading to his arrest when he took the 
stand in his trial de novo. No substantiat-
ing evidence was offered to buttress his 
assertion. Under the circumstances, the 
trial court may well have disbelieved him 
and given little weight to his testimony. 
Assuming arguendo that Lopez's truck 
was indeed disabled, jurisdictions with sim-
ilar statutes as ours have nonetheless 
found "actual physical control" of the driv-
er over the disabled car. The rationale was 
forcefully voiced in State v. Smelter, 674 
P.2d at 693: 
The focus should not be narrowly upon 
the mechanical condition of the car when 
it comes to rest, but upon the status of 
its occupant and the nature of the au-
thority he or she exerted over the vehicle 
in arriving at the place from which, by 
virtue of its inoperability, it can no long-
er move. Where, as here, circumstantial 
evidence permits a legitimate inference 
that the car was where it was and was 
performing as it was because of the de-
fendant's choice, it follows that the de-
fendant was in actual physical control. 
To hold otherwise could conceivably al-
low an intoxicated driver whose vehicle 
was rendered inoperable in a collision to 
escape prosecution. 
Citing Commonwealth v. Taylor, 237 Pa. 
3uper.212, 352 A.2d 137 (1975). Utah's 
statute provides for the arrest of one "in 
tctual physical control" of the vehicle while 
mder the influence of alcohol and/or 
Irugs. That requirement was intended by 
ur legislature to protect public, safety and 
pprehend the drunken driver^before he or 
he strikes, § 41-2-1.9.5; Garcia, 645 P.2d 
v. State, supra, 
and may not be construed to exclude those 
whose vehicles are presently immobile be-
cause of mechanical trouble. \State v. 
Smelter, supra. 
[6] The trial court here foJind that 
there were tire tracks leading up to the 
vehicle, that the vehicle had to have 
reached its point of rest "apparently on its 
own power," and that Lopez had failed the 
field sobriety tests. Those findings are 
supported by competent evidence |and will 
not be disturbed by this Court. 
[7-10] At trial, Lopez based his| refusal 
to submit to a breath test upon the rumors 
that there had been incidents of tampering 
with the breathalyzer in the past His 
retort to the officers at the scene was that 
he had taken the tests and passed them. A 
refusal simply means that an arrestee who 
is* asked to take a breath test "declines to 
do so of his own volition." Cavaness v. 
Cox, 598 P.2d 349 (Utah 1979). Whither or 
not that refusal is conditional makes no 
difference. Id. Likewise, it makes no dif-
ference whether or not a refusal is reason-
able. The result is still a license revocation 
of one year. By the same token, a refusal 
to answer yes or no to a request to take a 
breath test is still a refusal. Beck v. Cox, 
597 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1979). Lopez admitted 
that he had been requested to submit to the 
test and that he had refused. No more 
was required to invoke the sanction pf the 
statute. § 41-6-44.10(2), supra. 
[11] We do not reach the merits of Lo-
pez's claim that testimony on his refusal to 
take the breath test was inadmissib e be-
cause he was not aware that he was under 
arrest. Lopez's counsel did not object, but 
actively solicited that testimony from Lo-
pez on cross-examination. This Court will 
not review alleged error when no objection 
at all is made at the trial level. Sta\te v. 
Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983). 
The judgment is affirmed. 
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